Asia and Pacific > Taiwan, Province of China

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  • Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption x
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Mr. Felix J Vardy and Mr. John Morgan
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot---which we model as forcing interest groups to contract on outcomes rather than votes---is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its absence. We also study more sophisticated vote buying contracts. We show that, regardless of competition, the option to contract on both votes and outcomes is worthless, as it does not affect buyability as compared to contracting only on votes. In contrast, when interest groups can contract on votes and vote shares, we show that voting bodies are uniquely at risk of being bought.
Mr. Sanjeev Gupta and Mr. George T. Abed

Abstract

This volume presents 18 IMF research studies on the causes and consequences of corruption, as well as how it can most effectively be combated to improve governance, increase economic growth, and reduce poverty. The authors examine how civil service wages affect corruption, the impact of natural resource availability on corruption, the impact of corruption on a country’s income distribution and incidence of poverty, and the effect of corruption on government expenditures on health and education.

Mr. Qaizar Hussain and Clas Wihlborg
This paper explores insolvency and debt recovery procedures, and political, legal, and institutional factors influencing financial decisions of corporations and banks during pre-crisis years in six Asian economies. It also examines whether these factors may have contributed to the depth and duration of the 1997 crisis. There are two key findings: First, bank behavior and other institutional factors, and not the nature of stakeholder orientation, seem to explain variations in capital structures and the depth of recessions across economies. Second, aspects of insolvency procedures favoring rehabilitation of “financially distressed” firms seem to explain well the expected duration of the crisis.
Mr. Carlos A Leite and Jens Weidmann
This paper argues that natural resource abundance creates opportunities for rent-seeking behavior and is an important factor in determining a country’s level of corruption. In a simple growth model, we illustrate the interrelationships between natural resources, corruption, and economic growth, and discuss potential anti-corruption policies. We show that the extent of corruption depends on natural resource abundance, government policies, and the concentration of bureaucratic power. Furthermore, the growth effects of natural resource discoveries and anticorruption policies crucially depend on the economy’s state of development. We empirically corroborate the model’s implications in a cross-country framework with both corruption and growth endogenized.