Using zip code-level data and nonparametric estimation, I present eight stylized facts on the US housing market in the COVID-19 era. Some aggregate results are: (1) growth rate of median housing price during the four months (April-August 2020) since the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented monetary easing has accelerated faster than any four-month period in the lead-up to the 2007-09 global financial crisis; (2) the increase in housing demand in response to lower mortgage interest rates displays a structural break since March 2020 (housing demand has increased by much more than before). These results indicate either the existence of “fear of missing out” or COVID-induced fundamental changes in household behavior. In terms of distributional evidence, I find that the increase of housing demand seems more pronounced among the two ends of the income distribution, possibly reflecting relaxed liquidity constraints at the lower end and speculative demand at the higher end. I also find that the developments in housing price, demand, and supply since April 2020 are similar across urban, suburban, and rural areas. The paper highlights some potential unintended consequences of COVID-fighting policies and calls for further studies of the driving forces of the empirical findings.
The Tenth Periodic Monitoring Report (PMR) on the Status of Management Implementation Plans (MIPs) in Response to Board-Endorsed Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Recommendations assesses the progress made over the last year on actions contained in 10 MIPs with open management actions.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & and Review Department
This paper undertakes a triage of the backlog of open actions in Management Implementation Plans (MIPs) responding to recommendations by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), based on the Framework endorsed by the Board in March 2019.
This paper studies the relationship between banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign securities and credit growth to the private sector in emerging market and developing economies. Higher banks’ holdings of government debt are associated with a lower credit growth to the private sector and with a higher return on assets of the banking sector. Analysis suggests that the negative relationship between banks’ claims on the government and private sector credit growth mainly reflects a portfolio rebalancing of banks towards safer, more liquid public assets in stress times and provides only limited evidence of a crowding-out effect due to financial repression.
This paper analyzes the capital structure of private asset managers in which the acquisition of nonperforming loans (NPLs) is funded with Contingent Convertibles (CoCos) placed with investors. The paper develops a model based on NPL transfer prices and residual recovery rates to assess capital structures consisting of CoCos and equity. The CoCos would contain put and call options to write down losses and write up profits, respectively, arising from liquidation and restructuring procedures. The paper concludes that the protection mechanism provided by debt write-downs embedded in CoCos and the incentives to investors provided by debt write-ups could help bridge the gap between Portuguese banks’ NPL bid prices and private equity firms’ ask prices.
Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Mr. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Ms. Deniz O Igan, Elsie Addo Awadzi, Mr. Marc C Dobler, and Mr. Damiano Sandri
This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequences of bail-outs and the systemic spillovers from bail-ins.
The benefits of independent evaluation in international financial institutions have long been recognized. However, independent evaluation in these organizations is of increased relevance during uncertain times that call for more credible and legitimate institutions. While evaluation has long played a function in the IMF, and its role has expanded substantially with the creation of the IEO, independent evaluation has yet to take on a role within the IMF that fully reflects its potential contribution. A strong global economy requires a strong IMF, and a strong IMF requires a strong independent evaluation culture and practice. The establishment of the IEO was only the start of a process that still needs to be fostered and cultivated. Successful independent evaluation is important for the IMF to be perceived as legitimate and credible—and to achieve it, the independent evaluation function needs to be further integrated in the learning process and culture of the Fund. Independent evaluation has played a significant role in contributing to the improvement of the IMF, but the pending challenge is for the IMF and the IEO to create a shared culture that fully embraces the purpose and mission of the IEO, and the learning opportunities offered by independent evaluation. The IMF’s organizational culture has a profound role to play in prompting actions to make learning from independent evaluation a more vibrant element of the Fund’s activities. This book calls on IMF management to take a more active role in instilling the positive value of independent evaluation across the organization and thus enabling independent evaluation to bring the IMF closer to what the literature defines as the ideal of a “learning organization.”
The paper presents a tractable model to understand how international financial institutions (IFIs) should deal with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, in which case private creditors' bail-ins entail international spillovers. Besides lending to the country up to its borrowing capacity, IFIs face the difficult issue of how to address the remaining financing needs with a combination of fiscal consolidation, bail-ins and possibly official transfers. To maximize social welfare, IFIs should differentiate the policy mix depending on the strength of spillovers. In particular, stronger spillovers call for smaller bail-ins and greater fiscal consolidation. Furthermore, to avoid requiring excessive fiscal consolidation, IFIs should provide highly systemic countries with official transfers. To limit the moral hazard consequences of transfers, it is important that IFIs operate under a predetermined crisis-resolution framework that ensures commitment.