Political Science > Environmental Policy

You are looking at 1 - 6 of 6 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
Clear All Modify Search
Fotios Kalantzis, Salma Khalid, Alexandra Solovyeva, and Marcin Wolski
Using a novel cross-country dataset, which merges firm-level financials with information on firms’ participation in the European Unions’ Emissions Trading System (ETS), we investigate how firm performance is affected by tightening of environmental policies that put a price on pollution. We find that more stringent policies do not have a strong negative impact on the profitability of ETS-regulated or non-ETS firms. While firms report an increase in their input costs during periods of high carbon prices, their reported turnover is also higher. Among ETS-regulated firms which must purchase emission certificates under the EU ETS, tightening of climate policies in periods of high carbon prices results in increased investment, particularly in intangible assets. We establish robustness of our results using a quantile regression analysis, ensuring our key findings are not driven by distributional irregularities. Our findings provide support for the benefits of EU ETS on accelerating firms’ climate transition, while keeping firm-level financial costs at bay.
Ian W.H. Parry, Mr. Simon Black, Danielle N Minnett, Mr. Victor Mylonas, and Nate Vernon
Limiting global warming to 1.5 to 2°C above preindustrial levels requires rapid cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. This includes methane, which has an outsized impact on temperatures. To date, 125 countries have pledged to cut global methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030. This Note provides background on methane emission sources, presents practical fiscal policy options to cut emissions, and assesses impacts. Putting a price on methane, ideally through a fee, would reduce emissions efficiently, and can be administratively straightforward for extractives industries and, in some cases, agriculture. Policies could also include revenue-neutral ‘feebates’ that use fees on dirtier polluters to subsidize cleaner producers. A $70 methane fee among large economies would align 2030 emissions with 2oC. Most cuts would be in extractives and abatement costs would be equivalent to just 0.1 percent of GDP. Costs are larger in certain developing countries, implying climate finance could be a key element of a global agreement on a minimum methane price.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
This Management Implementation Plan (MIP) focuses on further strengthening collaboration between the IMF and the World Bank on strategic macro-structural issues. In macro-structural areas, the Fund and the Bank have complementary roles. The Bank provides structural and development-focused assessments and recommendations, while the Fund focuses on integrating macro relevant structural issues in the macroeconomic frameworks and policies. In some areas, including financial sector and public debt sustainability assessments, Bank-Fund collaboration modalities are well established. In other areas, such as climate change, Fund staff is developing comprehensive strategies on how the IMF can step up its engagement and collaboration with external partners, including with the World Bank, to better serve its membership. This MIP proposes concrete steps aimed at further enhancing: • Bank-Fund collaboration on strategic macro-structural issues, with an initial focus on the climate workstream; • Fund staff’s incentives for collaboration with external partners, including the Bank • Access to and exchange of information and knowledge between Bank and Fund staff.
Davide Furceri, Michael Ganslmeier, and Mr. Jonathan David Ostry
Are policies designed to avert climate change (Climate Change Policies, or CCPs) politically costly? Using data on governmental popular support and the OECD’s Environmental Stringency Index, we find that CCPs are not necessarily politically costly: policy design matters. First, only market-based CCPs (such as emission taxes) generate negative effects on popular support. Second, the effects are muted in countries where non-green (dirty) energy is a relatively small input into production. Third, political costs are not significant when CCPs are implemented during periods of low oil prices, generous social insurance and low inequality.
Mr. John Norregaard and Ms. Valerie Reppelin
This paper examines the relative merits of two dominant economic instruments for reducing pollution—”green” taxes and tradable permits. Theoretically, the two instruments share many similarities, and on balance, neither seems preferable to the other. In practice, however, most countries have relied more on taxes than on permits to control pollution. The analysis suggests a number of lessons to be learned from country experiences regarding the design and implementation of both instruments. While many, particularly European countries, currently have long-term programs involving environmental taxes, a willingness to experiment with tradable permits seems to be growing, especially given the Kyoto protocol emission targets.

Abstract

Microeconomic policies, dealing with individual industries and economic sectors, have traditionally addressed environmental concerns, but increasingly the environment is being viewed in terms of the macro economy. To improve its understanding of the interrelationship between macroeconomics and the environment, the IMF held a seminar in May 1995 at which recognized experts from academic and research institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and staff from the World Bank and the IMF shared their views on how macroeconomic policies affect the environment and how environmental policies affect the macro economy. The present volume, edited by Ved P. Gandhi, contains the papers and proceedings of this seminar.