This paper explores the intersection of climate change policies with banking supervisory law. Statutory mandates define banking supervisory agencies’ objectives, functions and powers. Policies that aim to address climate change risks appear fully germane to banking supervisors’ main objective of safety and soundness. As such, banking supervisory agencies have a duty to address climate risks in light of their mandate. A mandate that is not anchored on safety and soundness in light of best practice would blur the accountability of banking supervisory agencies and undermine their legitimacy also with respect to climate. While legal changes can help provide greater legal certaintly, particularly given the long-term perspective of climate change, bank supervisory agencies can take action without fundamental reforms of their legal framework. Accordingly, they have set expectations or requirements for banks to incorporate climate into their strategy and business model, risk management, and governance. A combination of legal instruments—based on soft law and hard law—helps to achieve this objective. Notwithstanding implementation challenges, taxonomies and disclosures remain important tools, and banking supervisors should assess their role in the development of such tools in light of their mandate. The key responsibility to address climate risks rests on banks, and corporate governance frameworks could assist.
Understanding the impact of climate mitigation policies is key to designing effective carbon pricing tools. We use institutional features of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and high-frequency data on more than 2,000 publicly listed European firms over 2011-21 to study the impact of carbon policies on stock returns. After extracting the surprise component of regulatory actions, we show that events resulting in higher carbon prices lead to negative abnormal returns which increase with a firm's carbon intensity. This negative relationship is even stronger for firms in sectors which do not participate in the EU ETS suggesting that investors price in transition risk stemming from the shift towards a low-carbon economy. We conclude that policies which increase carbon prices are effective in raising the cost of capital for emission-intensive firms.