Marcin Kolasa, Gurnain Kaur Pasricha, Mr. Suman S Basu, Ms. Emine Boz, and Dimitre Milkov
Insights from the IPF workstream can help guide the appropriate policy mix during an inflow surge, based on the shock and country characteristics. Inflow surges may be caused by a range of shocks and can take different forms in different countries. The IPF models suggest that warranted macroeconomic policy adjustments depend on the nature of the shock and country characteristics. The IPF models point to shocks and country characteristics that make it difficult to effectively respond to surges using only macroeconomic policy and exchange rate adjustment. The IPF models also suggest that, in the presence of overheating and overvaluation, the use of FXI and CFMs can enhance monetary autonomy in certain circumstances without generating other distortions. The relative costs and benefits of FXI and CFMs depend on country-specific factors. The IPF models also illustrate how surges can lead to a build-up of systemic financial risks. The IPF workstream connects the appropriate mix of MPMs and CFM/MPMs to the structure of the country's financial system.
The actions in this document aim at • Bringing the Fund’s framework for advice on capital flow policies up to date with recent research and lessons from experience. • Enhancing and coordinating a Fund-wide research • Ramping up the monitoring and analysis of capital flows. • Strengthening multilateral cooperation on policy issues affecting capital flows.
IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to "own" a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower.
Mr. Alex Mourmouras, Anna Ivanova, Mr. George C Anayiotos, and Mr. Wolfgang Mayer
This paper assesses the implementation of IMF-supported programs using measures of program interruptions, compliance with conditionality, and the share of committed funds disbursed. The econometric model allows an evaluation of the importance for program implementation of political conditions in borrowing countries, IMF effort, conditionality, as well as initial and external conditions. The paper concludes that program implementation depends primarily on borrowing countries' domestic political economy. Strong special interests, political instability, inefficient bureaucracies, lack of political cohesion, and ethno-linguistic divisions weaken program implementation. IMF effort, the extent and structure of conditionality, and initial and external conditions do not materially influence program prospects.
IMF lending is generally conditional on specified policies and outcomes. These conditions usually are negotiated compromises between policies initially favored by the Fund and by the country's authorities. In some cases the authorities might be satisfied enough with the outcome to take responsibility for it ("own" it) even though it was not their original preference. In other cases, they might accept the outcome only to obtain financing, in which case weak commitment might lead to poor implementation. This paper reviews the theoretical basis for the importance of ownership, summarizes what is known about its empirical effects, and suggests a strategy for strengthening it.