Political Science > Civics and Citizenship
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Abstract
This paper discusses that the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) has also launched three new evaluations—which will analyze the IMF’s role on fragile states, its financial surveillance activities, and its advice on unconventional monetary policies—and two evaluation updates—which will look into the IMF’s exchange rate policy advice and structural conditionality. The evaluation found that, for the most part, the IMF’s euro area surveillance identified the right issues during the pre-crisis period but did not foresee the magnitude of the risks that would later become paramount. The IMF’s surveillance of the financial regulatory architecture was generally of high quality, but staff, along with most other experts, missed the buildup of banking system risks in some countries. The report found several issues with the way decision making was managed by the IMF. In May 2010, the IMF Executive Board approved a decision to provide exceptional access financing to Greece without seeking preemptive debt restructuring, even though its sovereign debt was not deemed sustainable with a high probability.
Abstract
La Oficina de Evaluación Independiente (OEI) fue creada por el Directorio Ejecutivo del FMI en 2001. Proporciona evaluaciones objetivas e independientes sobre asuntos relacionados con el FMI. La OEI opera con independencia de la Gerencia y sin interferencias del Directorio Ejecutivo del FMI. Véase más información sobre las actividades de la OEl en su sitio web: www.ieo-imf.org.
Abstract
Le Bureau indépendant d’évaluation (BIE) a été créé en 2001 par le conseil d'administration du FMI. Il évalue de manière objective et indépendante des questions liées au FMI. Le BIE fonctionne en toute indépendance de la direction et du Conseil d’administration du FMI. Pour en savoir plus sur les activités du BIE, visitez son site web : www.ieo-imf.org.
Abstract
This evaluation examines factors influencing the effectiveness of the IMF structural conditionality in bringing about structural reform. It assesses the impact of the streamlining initiative launched in 2000 and of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines. These guidelines aimed at reducing the volume and scope of structural conditionality by requiring “parsimony” in the use of conditions and stipulated that conditions must be “critical” to the achievement of the program goals. The evaluation finds that during the period 1995–2004, there was extensive use of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with an average of 17 conditions per program/year.