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International Monetary Fund. Statistics Dept.
In response to a request from the authorities and as part of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) Enhanced Data Dissemination Initiative (EDDI) 2 project, a Government Finance Statistics (GFS) mission visited Lusaka, Zambia, during November 19–30, 2018. This was the third mission to Zambia under the DFID EDDI2 project, following the March 2016 and November 2017 missions. The mission worked essentially with staff at the Zambia Central Statistical Office (CSO) Public Finance Unit (PFU), but also had meetings with staff from the Ministry of Finance’s Accountant General, Budget, Investment and Debt Management, and Economic Management departments.
International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

Abstract

This paper discusses that the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) has also launched three new evaluations—which will analyze the IMF’s role on fragile states, its financial surveillance activities, and its advice on unconventional monetary policies—and two evaluation updates—which will look into the IMF’s exchange rate policy advice and structural conditionality. The evaluation found that, for the most part, the IMF’s euro area surveillance identified the right issues during the pre-crisis period but did not foresee the magnitude of the risks that would later become paramount. The IMF’s surveillance of the financial regulatory architecture was generally of high quality, but staff, along with most other experts, missed the buildup of banking system risks in some countries. The report found several issues with the way decision making was managed by the IMF. In May 2010, the IMF Executive Board approved a decision to provide exceptional access financing to Greece without seeking preemptive debt restructuring, even though its sovereign debt was not deemed sustainable with a high probability.

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

Abstract

La Oficina de Evaluación Independiente (OEI) fue creada por el Directorio Ejecutivo del FMI en 2001. Proporciona evaluaciones objetivas e independientes sobre asuntos relacionados con el FMI. La OEI opera con independencia de la Gerencia y sin interferencias del Directorio Ejecutivo del FMI. Véase más información sobre las actividades de la OEl en su sitio web: www.ieo-imf.org.

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

Abstract

Le Bureau indépendant d’évaluation (BIE) a été créé en 2001 par le conseil d'administration du FMI. Il évalue de manière objective et indépendante des questions liées au FMI. Le BIE fonctionne en toute indépendance de la direction et du Conseil d’administration du FMI. Pour en savoir plus sur les activités du BIE, visitez son site web : www.ieo-imf.org.

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

Abstract

This evaluation examines factors influencing the effectiveness of the IMF structural conditionality in bringing about structural reform. It assesses the impact of the streamlining initiative launched in 2000 and of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines. These guidelines aimed at reducing the volume and scope of structural conditionality by requiring “parsimony” in the use of conditions and stipulated that conditions must be “critical” to the achievement of the program goals. The evaluation finds that during the period 1995–2004, there was extensive use of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with an average of 17 conditions per program/year.

Mr. Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan, Mr. Alun H. Thomas, Ms. Tessa Van der Willigen, Ms. Uma Ramakrishnan, S. Reichold, Mr. Juan Zalduendo, and Mr. James P Walsh
This paper focuses on the fact that the 2004–2005 conditionality review expands to include a review of the application of the new Guidelines on Conditionality, adopted in 2002. These guidelines were the culmination of a comprehensive and far-reaching review of conditionality that aimed to enhance the effectiveness of IMF-supported programs. They represented the first revision of the IMF’s conditionality guidelines since 1979, and were developed by the IMF after seeking input from civil society and public forums held in several countries. This review comes at an early stage of experience with the new guidelines, and further evidence will be needed before definite conclusions can be drawn. The ultimate test of conditionality is whether it contributes to better economic outcomes, including over the medium term, and these cannot yet be gauged. Moreover, although this review draws in part on case studies, no substitute exists for cross-country analysis for identifying broad trends, and at this stage such analysis is hampered by small sample sizes.