The recent experience of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has stimulated the debate over currency union and reinforced the incentive for the emergence of currency blocs in other regions of the world. This paper builds a dynamic stochastic model-based on network externalities operating through trade channels-to explain the emergence of currency blocs, and specifically, why some countries join a currency union earlier than others. The paper develops and formalizes the intuition that currency bloc formation is path dependent, and that countries join currency blocs sooner the more they trade with the bloc member countries, with each additional member serving in a dynamic way to attract more members into the bloc. Evidence from the current pattern of EMU expansion supports the model, which is later used to elaborate on the pattern of further expansion of the union.
Mr. Robert A Feldman and Heliodoro Temprano-Arroyo
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has a number of institutional implications for the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and selected Mediterranean countries that aspire to join the European Union (EU). After describing the current institutional framework for their relations with the EU, the paper examines two basic categories of institutional effects: those stemming from the need to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria before joining the euro area, and those stemming from the need to adopt the EU’s institutional and legal provisions in the area of EMU.
The sheer size of mandated trade among members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and its composition and quality, means that its reorientation toward other markets entails a whole complex of structural adjustment policies. To be successful, policy reform must be comprehensive, with clarity of purpose and predictability of action. Nevertheless, while gradualism should not be used as an excuse for delay, reforms must be harmonized with the timetable of requisite institutional change. In any case, reform must be accompanied by trade liberalization to help break down domestic monopolies and to gain the efficiencies from division of labor.
This paper examines legal provisions and practices of the IMF that involve nonmember states. It considers certain preliminary topics including: categories of nonmembers, subordinate territories for which members are responsible, and ex-members. It then discusses three ways in which nonmembers are affected either because members are limited in their freedom of action in dealing with nonmembers or because nonmembers have consented to certain obligations or standards that parallel those of the Articles. Withholding of certain benefits from nonmembers is also outlined.