Mr. Dong He, Annamaria Kokenyne, Mr. Tommaso Mancini Griffoli, Mr. Marcello Miccoli, Mr. Thorvardur Tjoervi Olafsson, Gabriel Soderberg, and Hervé Tourpe
This fintech note looks at how capital flow measures (CFMs) could be implemented with central bank digital currency (CBDC), and what benefits, risks and complexities could arise. There are several implications of the analysis. First, CBDC ecosystems should generally be designed such that they can accommodate the introduction of CFMs. Second, thanks to the programmability of the payment infrastructure given by the new digital technologies, certain CFMs could likely be implemented more efficiently and effectively with CBDC compared to the traditional system. Third, implementing CFMs requires central banks to collaborate on practices and standards. Finally, CFMs on CBDC need to operate alongside traditional CFMs.
Zhuohui Chen, Nikolaos Kourentzes, and Mr. Romain M Veyrune
Implementing monetary policy largely consists in controlling short-term interest rates which supposes having a good understanding of banks’ demand for liquidity also called “reserves” at the central bank. This work aims to offer a modeling methodology for estimating the demand for reserves that itself is influenced by various macro and market structure variables. The model can help central banks to identify ”stable points” on the demand for reserves, which correspond to the levels of reserves for which the short-term interest rate volatility is minimal. Both parametric and non-parametric approaches are provided, with a particular focus on capturing the modeling uncertainty and, therefore, facilitating scenario analysis. A method is proposed to test the forecasting performances of different approaches and exogenous regressors combination, finding that simpler parametric expressions provide on balance better performances. Adding variables to both parametric and non-parametric provides better explanations and predictions. The proposed methodology is evaluated using data from the Euro system and the US Federal Reserve System.
Tokens are units digitally represented in a distributed ledger or blockchain. The various uses of this technology have the potential to transform a wide array of economic activities, from traditional commercial transactions to sophisticated financial undertakings. This paper explores the similarities and differences of tokens with traditional legal instruments in commercial law and how tokens could offer superior solutions, provided that proper legal foundations are established for their operation, including aspects of the law of securities and consumer protection law.
Mr. Dong He, Annamaria Kokenyne, Xavier Lavayssière, Ms. Inutu Lukonga, Nadine Schwarz, Nobuyasu Sugimoto, and Jeanne Verrier
Capital flow management measures (CFMs) can be part of the broader policy toolkit to help countries reap the benefits of capital flows while managing the associated risks. Their implementation typically requires that financial intermediaries verify the nature of transactions and the identities of transacting parties but is facing the rising challenge of crypto assets. Indeed, crypto assets have become a significant instrument for payments and speculative investments in some countries. They can be traded pseudonymously and held without identification of the residency of the asset holder. Many crypto service providers operate across borders, making supervision and enforcement by national authorities more difficult. The challenges posed by the attributes of crypto assets are compounded by gaps in the legal and regulatory frameworks. This paper aims to discuss how crypto assets could impact the effectiveness of CFMs from a structural and longer-term perspective. To preserve the effectiveness of CFMs against crypto-related challenges, policymakers need to consider a multifaceted strategy whose essential elements include clarifying the legal status of crypto assets and ensuring that CFM laws and regulations cover them; devising a comprehensive, consistent, and coordinated regulatory approach to crypto assets and applying it effectively to CFMs; establishing international collaborative arrangements for supervision of crypto assets; addressing data gaps and leveraging technology (regtech and suptech) to create anomaly-detection models and red-flag indicators that will allow for timely risk monitoring and CFM implementation.
This note explains the value of strategic foresight and provides implementation advice based on the IMF’s experience with scenario planning and policy gaming. Section II provides an overview of strategic foresight and some of its tools. Scenario planning and policy gaming have been the Fund’s main foresight techniques so far, though other tools have been complementary. Accordingly, section III focuses on the scenario planning by illustrating applications before detailing the methods we have been using, while section IV describes policy gaming including the matrix policy gaming approach with which we have experimented so far. Section V summarizes the key points. In so doing, the note extends an invitation to those in the economics and finance fields (e.g., researchers, policymakers) to incorporate strategic foresight in their analysis and decision making.
There are demands on central banks and financial regulators to take on new responsibilities for supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy. Regulators can indeed facilitate the reorientation of financial flows necessary for the transition. But their powers should not be overestimated. Their diagnostic and policy toolkits are still in their infancy. They cannot (and should not) expand their mandate unilaterally. Taking on these new responsibilities can also have potential pitfalls and unintended consequences. Ultimately, financial regulators cannot deliver a low-carbon economy by themselves and should not risk being caught again in the role of ‘the only game in town.’