Narrow Your Choices

Refine By Countries

Refine By Series

Refine By Language

Refine By Date

—

Refine By IMF Taxonomy

Refine By JEL Taxonomy

Refine by LOC Taxonomy

Refine By THEMA Taxonomy

  • Print
  • Save

Law > Business and Financial

You are looking at 1 - 2 of 2 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
Clear All Modify Search
Cover IMF Working Papers
Developments in Financial Supervision and the Use of Macroprudential Measures in Central America
Mr. Mynor Meza and Mr. Fernando L Delgado
Improvements in financial regulation and supervision in the Central American region (CAPDR) have strengthened financial stability. Prudential instruments with potential macroeconomic effects have been introduced. Nonetheless, compared with the larger Latin American and selected industrial countries, there is still important scope for CAPDR to enhance financial supervision and regulation. Based on two surveys, and the analysis of the Basel Core Principles, the paper determines that some weaknesses exist in risk-based supervision, and that macroprudential measures have scarcely been deployed.
Keywords:
WP; CAPDR; BCP compliance index; foreign exchange; BCP assessment; BCP principle; capital; financial regulation; financial supervision; Basel Core Principles; Basel III; macroprudential policy; Central America; Latin America; CAPDR country; financial activity; Risk-based supervision; Macroprudential policy instruments; Consolidated banking supervision; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability–Exploring the Determinants
Donato Masciandaro, Mr. Marc G Quintyn, and Mr. Michael W Taylor
We analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank.
Keywords:
WP; governance arrangement; monetary policy; governance rating; independence rating