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Zhuohui Chen, Nikolaos Kourentzes, and Mr. Romain M Veyrune
Implementing monetary policy largely consists in controlling short-term interest rates which supposes having a good understanding of banks’ demand for liquidity also called “reserves” at the central bank. This work aims to offer a modeling methodology for estimating the demand for reserves that itself is influenced by various macro and market structure variables. The model can help central banks to identify ”stable points” on the demand for reserves, which correspond to the levels of reserves for which the short-term interest rate volatility is minimal. Both parametric and non-parametric approaches are provided, with a particular focus on capturing the modeling uncertainty and, therefore, facilitating scenario analysis. A method is proposed to test the forecasting performances of different approaches and exogenous regressors combination, finding that simpler parametric expressions provide on balance better performances. Adding variables to both parametric and non-parametric provides better explanations and predictions. The proposed methodology is evaluated using data from the Euro system and the US Federal Reserve System.
Mr. José M. Garrido
Tokens are units digitally represented in a distributed ledger or blockchain. The various uses of this technology have the potential to transform a wide array of economic activities, from traditional commercial transactions to sophisticated financial undertakings. This paper explores the similarities and differences of tokens with traditional legal instruments in commercial law and how tokens could offer superior solutions, provided that proper legal foundations are established for their operation, including aspects of the law of securities and consumer protection law.
Mr. Dimitri G Demekas and Pierpaolo Grippa
There are demands on central banks and financial regulators to take on new responsibilities for supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy. Regulators can indeed facilitate the reorientation of financial flows necessary for the transition. But their powers should not be overestimated. Their diagnostic and policy toolkits are still in their infancy. They cannot (and should not) expand their mandate unilaterally. Taking on these new responsibilities can also have potential pitfalls and unintended consequences. Ultimately, financial regulators cannot deliver a low-carbon economy by themselves and should not risk being caught again in the role of ‘the only game in town.’
Mr. Ashraf Khan
This paper describes how behavioral elements are relevant to financial supervision, regulation, and central banking. It focuses on (1) behavioral effects of norms (social, legal, and market); (2) behavior of others (internalization, identification, and compliance); and (3) psychological biases. It stresses that financial supervisors, regulators, and central banks have not yet realized the full potential that these behavioral elements hold. To do so, they need to devise a behavioral approach that includes aspects relating to individual and group behavior. The paper provides case examples of experiments with such an approach, including behavioral supervision. Finally, it highlights areas for further research.
Mr. Ashraf Khan
This paper argues that central bank legal protection contributes to safeguarding a central bank and its financial supervisor’s independence, especially for conducting monetary and financial stability policy. However, such legal protection also entails enhanced accountability. To this end, the paper provides a selected overview of legal protection for central banks and financial supervisors (if the supervisor is part of the central bank), focusing on liability, immunity, and indemnification arrangements, and based on the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database. The paper also uses data from the IMF’s Article IV and FSAP Database, and the IMF MCM’s Technical Assistance Database. It lists selected country cases for illustrative purposes. It introduces the concepts of “appropriate legal protection” and “function-specific legal protection” as topics for further research.
Jihad Dagher
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Mr. Jongsoon Shin
This paper describes issues in Korea’s corporate sector, the need for restructuring, and the authorities’ initiatives and challenges. It then identifies lessons from other countries’ experience and conducts an econometric analysis based on cross-country aggregate data, compared with previous studies which mostly use firm-level data. This analysis finds that restructuring episodes, while sometimes challenging in the short term, have typically been associated with more rapid economic growth afterward. Corporate restructuring could have a negative effect on the labor and the financial markets in the short term, but is associated with positive growth through increased investment and capital productivity in the medium term, outpacing the negative effects.