Western Hemisphere > Guatemala

You are looking at 1 - 3 of 3 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Financial regulation and supervision x
Clear All Modify Search
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.
This Selected Issues paper estimates both Guatemala’s potential output and output gap using a wide range of econometric techniques. The analysis suggests that Guatemala’s potential output growth is about 3.5 percent for the whole sample period and that the output gap is almost closed. Results are highly robust among different methodologies. Among the methods used, several well-known time series filters and two different estimations of a state-space model are included. Additionally, a test for structural breaks in the series of potential GDP is presented. All methodologies conclude that the output gap at the end of 2012 is almost closed at -0.2 percent of potential GDP.
Mr. Mynor Meza and Mr. Fernando L Delgado
Improvements in financial regulation and supervision in the Central American region (CAPDR) have strengthened financial stability. Prudential instruments with potential macroeconomic effects have been introduced. Nonetheless, compared with the larger Latin American and selected industrial countries, there is still important scope for CAPDR to enhance financial supervision and regulation. Based on two surveys, and the analysis of the Basel Core Principles, the paper determines that some weaknesses exist in risk-based supervision, and that macroprudential measures have scarcely been deployed.
Donato Masciandaro, Mr. Marc G Quintyn, and Mr. Michael W Taylor
We analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank.