Oya Celasun, Mr. Niels-Jakob H Hansen, Ms. Aiko Mineshima, Mariano Spector, and Jing Zhou
Supply constraints hurt the economic recovery and boosted inflation in 2021. We find that in the euro area, manufacturing output and GDP would have been about 6 and 2 percent higher, respectively, and half of the rise in manufacturing producer price inflation would not have occurred in the absence of supply bottlenecks. Globally, shutdowns can explain up to 40 percent of the supply shocks. Sectors that are more reliant on differentiated inputs—such as autos—are harder hit. Late last year industry experts expected supply shortages for autos to largely dissipate by mid-2022 and broader bottlenecks by end-2022, but given the Omicron wave, disruptions will last for longer, possibly into 2023. With supply constraints adding to price pressures, the challenge for policymakers is to support recovery without allowing high inflation to become entrenched.
We apply a range of models to the U.K. data to obtain estimates of the output gap. A structural VAR with an appropriate identification strategy provides improved estimates of output gap with better real time properties and lower sensitivity to temporary shocks than the usual filtering techniques. It also produces smaller out-of-sample forecast errors for inflation. At the same time, however, our results suggest caution in basing policy decisions on output gap estimates.
The effect that the recent decline in the price of oil has had on growth is far from clear, with many observers at odds to explain why it does not seem to have provided a significant boost to the world economy. This paper aims to address this puzzle by providing a systematic analysis of the effect of oil price shocks on growth for 72 countries comprising 92.8% of world GDP. We find that, on net, shocks driving the oil price in 2015 shaved off 0.2 percentage points of growth for the median country in our sample, and 0.17 percentage points in GDP-weighted terms. While increases in oil supply and shocks to oil-specific demand actually boosted growth in 2015 (by about 0.2 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively), weak global demand more than offset these gains, reducing growth by 0.8 percentage points. Counterfactual simulations for the 72 countries in our sample underscore the importance of diversification, rather than low levels of openness, in shielding against negative shocks to the world economy.
Jonas Dovern, Mr. Ulrich Fritsche, Mr. Prakash Loungani, and Ms. Natalia T. Tamirisa
We study forecasts for real GDP growth using a large panel of individual forecasts from 36 advanced and emerging economies during 1989–2010. We show that the degree of information rigidity in average forecasts is substantially higher than that in individual forecasts. Individual level forecasts are updated quite frequently, a behavior more in line “noisy” information models (Woodford, 2002; Sims, 2003) than with the assumptions of the sticky information model (Mankiw and Reis, 2002). While there are cross-country variations in information rigidity, there is no systematic difference between advanced and emerging economies.
Ms. Sally Chen, Mr. Philip Liu, Andrea M. Maechler, Chris Marsh, Mr. Sergejs Saksonovs, and Mr. Hyun S Shin
This paper explores the concept of global liquidity, its measurement and macro-financial importance. We construct two sets of indicators for global liquidity: a quantity series distinguishing between core and noncore liabilities of financial intermediatires and a corresponding price series. Using price and quantity indicators simultaneously, it is possible to distinguish between shocks to the supply and demand for global liquidity, and isolate their impact on the economy. Our results confirm that global liquidity conditions matter for economic and financial stability, and points to indicators whose regular monitoring could be valuable to policymakers.
This paper investigates the impact of the new capital requirements introduced under the Basel III framework on bank lending rates and loan growth. Higher capital requirements, by raising banks’ marginal cost of funding, lead to higher lending rates. The data presented in the paper suggest that large banks would on average need to increase their equity-to-asset ratio by 1.3 percentage points under the Basel III framework. GMM estimations indicate that this would lead large banks to increase their lending rates by 16 basis points, causing loan growth to decline by 1.3 percent in the long run. The results also suggest that banks’ responses to the new regulations will vary considerably from one advanced economy to another (e.g. a relatively large impact on loan growth in Japan and Denmark and a relatively lower impact in the U.S.) depending on cross-country variations in banks’ net cost of raising equity and the elasticity of loan demand with respect to changes in loan rates.
This is the second chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled "On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say." We begin by discussing the costs of inflation, including their role in generating boom-bust cycles. Following a general discussion of the need for a nominal anchor, we describe a specific type of monetary anchor, the inflation-targeting regime, and its two key intellectual roots-the absence of long-run trade-offs and the time-inconsistency problem. We conclude by providing a brief introduction to the way in which inflation targeting works.
This is the third chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled "On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say." It examines a number of elements in the design of an inflation-targeting framework. These include the definition of the target variable, the relevance of core measures of inflation, and the advantages and disadvantages of point targets, point targets with a band, and range targets. It then discusses the choice of a long-term inflation rate, the target horizon, and the policy horizon.
Overall competitiveness of the Dutch economy seems adequate, but domestically produced exports have lost market share recently. Over the past three decades, globalization has greatly influenced economies as countries have become more integrated. Empirical studies on business cycles synchronization and transmission of shocks among countries have provided conflicting results. In its descriptive part, this study concludes that Dutch export competitiveness is not a problem so far. This also finds that the Netherlands is relatively more exposed to supply-driven shocks while Germany is more exposed to demand-driven shocks.