Vizhdan Boranova, Raju Huidrom, Ezgi O. Ozturk, Ara Stepanyan, Petia Topalova, and Shihangyin (Frank) Zhang
The auto sector is macro-critical in many European countries and constitutes one of the main supply chains in the region. Using a multi-sector and multi-country general equilibrium model, this paper presents a quantitative assessment of the impact of global pandemic-induced labor supply shocks—both directly and via supply chains—during the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic on the auto sector and aggregate activity in Europe. Our results suggest that these labor supply shocks would have a significant adverse impact on the major auto producers in Europe, with one-third of the decline in the value added of the car sector attributable to spillovers via supply chains within and across borders. Within borders, the pandemic-induced labor supply shocks in the services sector have a bigger adverse impact, reflecting their larger size and associated demand effects. Across borders, spillovers from the pandemic-induced labor supply shocks that originate in other European countries are larger than those that originate outside the region, though the latter are still sizable.
Rui Mano, Johannes Eugster, Mr. Dirk V Muir, and Mr. Shanaka J Peiris
This paper proposes channels through which technological decoupling can affect global growth, and embeds these different layers in a global dynamic macroeconomic model. Multiple scenarios are considered that differ along two dimensions: (i) the coalition of countries (hubs) that initiate the decoupling, and (ii) whether non-hub countries are also forced to decouple via ‘preferential attachment’ – i.e. by aligning themselves with the hub they trade most with. All global technology hubs lose across scenarios, and losses are largest under preferential attachment. Smaller countries with relations that straddle multiple hubs generally lose, whereas those whose trade is heavily concentrated with one hub may gain due to reduced competition under some scenarios. Technological fragmentation can lead to losses in the order of 5 percent of GDP for many economies.
Raju Huidrom, Nemanja Jovanovic, Mr. Carlos Mulas-Granados, Ms. Laura Papi, Ms. Faezeh Raei, Mr. Emil Stavrev, and Mr. Philippe Wingender
Europe is deeply integrated into global value chains and recent trade tensions raise the question of how European economies would be affected by the introduction of tariffs or other trade barriers. This paper estimates the impact of trade shocks and growth spillovers using value added measures to better gauge the associated costs across European countries.
How much do firms benefit from foreign R&D and through what channel? We construct a global network of corporate innovation using more than 1.5 million patents granted to firms in OECD countries. We test the “international technology sourcing” hypothesis that foreign innovation activities tap into foreign R&D and improve home productivity through knowledge spillovers. We find that firms with stronger inventor presence in technology frontier countries benefit disproportionately more from their R&D. The strength of knowledge spillovers depends on the direction of technology sourcing. Knowledge externality is larger for firms in technology frontier countries than for firms in non-frontier countries.
Ms. Era Dabla-Norris, Pietro Dallari, and Mr. Tigran Poghosyan
We estimate a panel VAR model that captures cross-country, dynamic interlinkages for 10 euro area countries using quarterly data for the period 1999-2016. Our analysis suggests that fiscal spillovers are significant and tend to be larger for countries with close trade and financial links as well, as for fiscal shocks originating from larger countries. The current account appears to be the main channel of transmission, although strong trade integration among countries in the euro area and spillback effects tend to zero-out the net trade impact in some cases. A subsample analysis shows that the effects of fiscal policy have changed over time, with larger estimated domestic multipliers and spillovers between 2011 and 2014.
Patrick Blagrave, Giang Ho, Ksenia Koloskova, and Mr. Esteban Vesperoni
Are fiscal spillovers today as large as they were during the global financial crisis? How do they depend on economic and policy conditions? This note informs the debate on the cross-border impact of fiscal policy on economic activity, shedding light on the magnitude and the factors affecting transmission, such as the fiscal instruments used, cyclical positions, monetary policy conditions, and exchange rate regimes. The note assesses spillovers from five major advanced economies (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) on 55 advanced and emerging market economies that represent 85 percent of global output, looking at government-spending and tax revenue shocks during expansion and consolidation episodes. It finds that fiscal spillovers are economically significant in the presence of slack and/or accommodative monetary policy—and considerably smaller otherwise, which suggests that spillovers are large when domestic multipliers are also large. It also finds that spillovers from government-spending shocks are larger and more persistent than those from tax shocks and that transmission may be stronger among countries with fixed exchange rates. The evidence suggests that although spillovers from fiscal policies in the current environment may not be as large as they were during the crisis, they may still be important under certain economic circumstances.
The global upswing in economic activity is strengthening. Global growth, which in 2016 was the weakest since the global financial crisis at 3.2 percent, is projected to rise to 3.6 percent in 2017 and to 3.7 percent in 2018. The growth forecasts for both 2017 and 2018 are 0.1 percentage point stronger compared with projections earlier this year. Broad-based upward revisions in the euro area, Japan, emerging Asia, emerging Europe, and Russia—where growth outcomes in the first half of 2017 were better than expected—more than offset downward revisions for the United States and the United Kingdom. But the recovery is not complete: while the baseline outlook is strengthening, growth remains weak in many countries, and inflation is below target in most advanced economies. Commodity exporters, especially of fuel, are particularly hard hit as their adjustment to a sharp step down in foreign earnings continues. And while short-term risks are broadly balanced, medium-term risks are still tilted to the downside. The welcome cyclical pickup in global activity thus provides an ideal window of opportunity to tackle the key policy challenges—namely to boost potential output while ensuring its benefits are broadly shared, and to build resilience against downside risks. A renewed multilateral effort is also needed to tackle the common challenges of an integrated global economy.
Mr. Heedon Kang, Mr. Francis Vitek, Ms. Rina Bhattacharya, Mr. Phakawa Jeasakul, Ms. Sònia Muñoz, Naixi Wang, and Rasool Zandvakil
This paper analyzes cross-border macrofinancial spillovers from a variety of macroprudential policy measures, using a range of quantitative methods. Event study and panel regression analyses find that liquidity and sectoral macroprudential policy measures often affect cross-border bank credit, whereas capital measures do not. This empirical evidence is stronger for tightening than for loosening measures, is distributed across credit leakage and reallocation effects, and is generally regionally concentrated. Consistently, structural model based simulation analysis indicates that output and bank credit spillovers from sectoral macroprudential policy shocks are generally small worldwide, but are regionally concentrated and economically significant for countries connected by strong trade or financial linkages. This simulation analysis also indicates that countercyclical capital buffer adjustments have the potential to generate sizeable regional spillovers.