Andrés Fernández, Mr. Michael W Klein, Mr. Alessandro Rebucci, Mr. Martin Schindler, and Martin Uribe
This paper presents a new dataset of capital control restrictions on both inflows and outflows of 10 categories of assets for 100 countries over the period 1995 to 2013. Building on the data in Schindler (2009) and other datasets based on the analysis of the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), this dataset includes additional asset categories, more countries, and a longer time period. The paper discusses in detail the construction of the dataset and characterizes the data with respect to the prevalence and correlation of controls across asset categories and between controls on inflows and controls on outflows, the aggregation of the separate categories into broader indicators, and the comparison of this dataset with other indicators of capital controls.
Financial network analysis is used to provide firm level bottom-up holistic visualizations of interconnections of financial obligations in global OTC derivatives markets. This helps to identify Systemically Important Financial Intermediaries (SIFIs), analyse the nature of contagion propagation, and also monitor and design ways of increasing robustness in the network. Based on 2009 FDIC and individually collected firm level data covering gross notional, gross positive (negative) fair value and the netted derivatives assets and liabilities for 202 financial firms which includes 20 SIFIs, the bilateral flows are empirically calibrated to reflect data-based constraints. This produces a tiered network with a distinct highly clustered central core of 12 SIFIs that account for 78 percent of all bilateral exposures and a large number of financial intermediaries (FIs) on the periphery. The topology of the network results in the “Too- Interconnected-To-Fail” (TITF) phenomenon in that the failure of any member of the central tier will bring down other members with the contagion coming to an abrupt end when the ‘super-spreaders’ have demised. As these SIFIs account for the bulk of capital in the system, ipso facto no bank among the top tier can be allowed to fail, highlighting the untenable implicit socialized guarantees needed for these markets to operate at their current levels. Systemic risk costs of highly connected SIFIs nodes are not priced into their holding of capital or collateral. An eigenvector centrality based ‘super-spreader’ tax has been designed and tested for its capacity to reduce the potential socialized losses from failure of SIFIs.
We document external investment positions among European Union countries at the start of the financial crisis through the creation of a new database comprising bilateral external financial asset and liabilities, excluding reserve assets and derivatives. While there are some gaps in the data, the overall coverage of reported bilateral net international investment positions (IIPs) appears satisfactory. The dataset provides a richer picture of financial linkages, enabling us to map the financing of Euro area imbalances. Creditor and debtor positions vis-à-vis the rest of the EU have tended to increase between 2000 and 2008, with capital flowing largely from wealthier to catching-up economies. This has in particular resulted in an increased interdependency among Euro Area economies.
Given the rapid evolution of the U.S. financial sector and attendant regulatory challenges, this paper explores ways to fine-tune U.S. oversight arrangements. It surveys the financial landscape, separating a highly regulated, multi-business, and (in terms of relative asset holdings) shrinking “core” from a lightly regulated, more specialized, and rapidly expanding “periphery” explains the U.S. regulatory philosophy and structure, with its focus on core institutions and its jurisdictional complexity; highlights certain new challenges, without presuming to have all the solutions; draws out some broad policy implications, from the “30,000 foot level” and concludes by tabling and discussing one, specific, reform idea.
The increasing ability to trade credit risk in financial markets has facilitated its dispersion across the financial and other sectors. However, specific risks attached to credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments in a market with still-limited liquidity means that its rapid expansion may actually pose problems for financial sector stability in the event of a major negative shock to credit markets. This paper attempts to quantify the exposure of major U.K. financial groups to credit derivatives, by applying a vector autoregression (VAR) model to publicly available market prices. Our results indicate that use of credit derivatives does not pose a substantial threat to financial sector stability in the United Kingdom. Exposures across major financial institutions appear sufficiently diversified to limit the impact of any shock to the market, while major insurance companies are largely exposed to the "safer" senior tranches.
Systemic risk remains a major concern to policymakers since widespread defaults in the corporate and financial sectors could pose substantial costs to society. Forward-looking measures and/or indicators of systemic default risk are thus needed to identify potential buildups of vulnerability in advance. In this paper, we explain how to construct idiosyncratic and systemic default risk indicators using the information embedded in single-tranche standardized collateralized debt obligations (STCDOs) referencing credit derivatives indices. As an illustration, both risk indicators are constructed for the European corporate sector using midprice quotes for STCDOs referencing the iTraxx Europe index.
This paper generalizes a market-based indicator for financial sector surveillance using a multifactor latent structure in the determination of the default probabilities of an nth-todefault credit default swap (CDS) basket of large complex financial institutions (LCFIs). To estimate the multifactor latent structure, we link the market risk (the covariance of the LCFIs' equity) to credit risk (the default probability of the CDS basket) in a coherent manner. In addition, to analyze the response of the probabilities of default to changing macroeconomic conditions, we run a stress test by generating shocks to the latent multifactor structure. The results unveil a rich set of default probability dynamics and help in identifying the most relevant sources of risk. We anticipate that this approach could be of value to financial supervisors and risk managers alike.
The System of National Accounts 1993 (1993 SNA) provided new standards for the statistical treatment of financial derivatives. Subsequently, financial derivative markets have evolved, and there have been requests from national statisticians for clarification and amplification of the recommendations in the 1993 SNA and the fifth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5). Meeting this need is the main purpose of this working paper. Its recommendations have been widely discussed in international meetings and have been approved by bodies that effect changes in the 1993 SNA and BPM5.
Many central banks around the world are gradually shifting from a system of direct controls towards the implementation of monetary policy through market-oriented instruments, including refinance facilities. This paper reviews the use of refinance instruments in a sample of industrialized countries, and discusses how central banks use them to influence short-term interest rates and to manage banks’ reserves. Some lessons are suggested for their implementation in developing countries or economies in transition.