In global financial centers, short-term market rates are effectively determined in the pledged collateral market, where banks and other financial institutions exchange collateral (such as bonds and equities) for money. Furthermore, the use of long-dated securities as collateral for short tenors—or example, in securities-lending and repo markets, and prime brokerage funding—impacts the risk premia (or moneyness) along the yield curve. In this paper, we deploy a methodology to show that transactions using long dated collateral also affect short-term market rates. Our results suggest that the unwind of central bank balance sheets will likely strengthen the monetary policy transmission, as dealer balance-sheet space is now relatively less constrained, with a rebound in collateral reuse.
Transactions on wholesale capital markets are often secured by marketable collateral. However, collateral needs balance sheet space to move within the financial system. Certain new regulations that constrain private sector bank balance sheets may have the effect of impeding collateral flows. This may have important consequences for monetary policy transmission, for short term money market functioning, and for market liquidity. In this context (and in contrast to the literature, which has focused mainly on the repo market), this paper analyzes securities-lending, derivatives, and prime-brokerage markets as suppliers of collateral. It highlights the incentives created by new regulations for different suppliers of collateral. Moreover, it argues that the central banks should be mindful of the effect of their actions on the ability of markets to intermediate collateral.
In recent years, many money and repo rates in the United States have been between zero and 25 basis points. As Fed’s liftoff approaches, the question of the level of these rates (and the markets that determine them) becomes increasingly important. The paper discusses (i) whether the Fed can control short–term rates as it starts to tighten; and (ii) what are the advantages and disadvantages of using asset sales versus a large reverse repo program (RRP). A large RRP by the Fed will deprive the financial system of the money pool (i.e., GSEs and money market funds) as the Fed will directly absorb the money on to its balance sheet. This will rust the financial plumbing that connects the money pool to collateral suppliers. Some asset sales may be preferred to a large RRP as this will result in a market-determined repo rate and will allow the Fed to reach its monetary policy liftoff objectives with minimal footprint on market plumbing. We also discuss cost of issuing short tenor T-bills relative to a large RRP in a rising rate environment.
This paper focuses on how changes in financial plumbing of the markets may impact the monetary policy options as central banks contemplate lift off from zero lower bound (ZLB). Under the proposed regulations, banks will face leverage ratio constraints. As a result of quantitative easing (QE), banks want balance sheet “space” for financial intermediation/ non-depository activities. At the same time, regulatory changes are boosting demand for high quality liquid assets. The paper also discusses the role of repo markets and the importance of collateral velocity and the need to avoid wedges between repo and monetary policy rates when leaving ZLB.
This paper highlights the changing collateral landscape and how it may shape the global demand/supply for collateral. We first identify the key collateral pools (relative to the “old” collateral space) and associated collateral velocities. Post-Lehman and continuing into the European crisis, some aspects of unconventional monetary policies pursued by central banks are significantly altering the collateral space. Moreover, regulatory demands stemming from Basel III, Dodd Frank, EMIR etc., new net debt issuance, and collateral connectivity via custodians (e.g., Euroclear/ Clearstream/ BoNY etc) will affect collateral movements.