Archived Series > Occasional Papers

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Mr. Atish R. Ghosh, Mr. Juan Zalduendo, Mr. Alun H. Thomas, Mr. Jun I Kim, Ms. Uma Ramakrishnan, and Mr. Bikas Joshi

Abstract

This paper examines the various roles of IMF financing in crisis prevention. Emerging market economies that experienced financial crises in the past have been subject to enormous economic and social costs, highlighting the importance of crisis prevention. While the main defense against a crisis lies in a country’s own policies and institutional framework, the IMF can contribute to these efforts through its surveillance activities, provision of technical assistance, and promotion of standards and codes. But the IMF may be able to contribute to crisis prevention more directly by providing contingent financial support. This paper explores the theoretical basis of, and empirical evidence for, possible “crisis prevention programs.”

Mr. Harald Finger and Mr. Mauro Mecagni

Abstract

Restoring a country's debt to a sustainable path after a sovereign debt restructuring is key to ensuring a credible and durable exit from the crisis. In recent years, a number of countries have restructured their sovereign liabilities, either following a default, or preemptively, to avoid a default. This Occasional Paper takes stock of the experiences of some of these countries--Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Moldova, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uruguay--with debt-restructuring operations, with a view to assessing the outcomes and whether debt sustainability has been restored. The emphasis of the study is on sovereign debt owed to private creditors.

Mr. David S. Hoelscher, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Ulrich H Klueh

Abstract

This paper describes recently established deposit insurance systems, identifying emerging trends. In line with previous IMF work on the subject, it argues against the development of "best practices" applicable to all systems. Rather, it stresses the importance of incorporating each country’s individual objectives in adopting a deposit insurance system, as well as that country’s characteristics, to ensure an effective system that minimizes disincentives and distortions to financial sector intermediation. The paper includes a summary of the academic literature.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. David S. Hoelscher

Abstract

Recent financial sector crises and their resolution have raised new issues and provided additional experiences to draw on in the future. Banking sector problems in Russia, Turkey, and a few Latin American countries occurred within the context of highly dollarized economies, high levels of sovereign debt, severely limited fiscal resources, or combinations thereof. These factors have challenged the effectiveness of many of the typical tools for bank resolution. This publication focuses on the issues raised in systemic crises, not on the resolution of individual bank problems. Based on the lessons learned during the Asian crisis, it updates the IMF’s work on the general principles, strategies, and techniques for managing these crises.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn and Mr. David S. Hoelscher

Abstract

Recent financial sector crises and their resolution have raised new issues and provided additional experiences to draw on in the future. Banking sector problems in Russia, Turkey, and a few Latin American countries occurred within the context of highly dollarized economies, high levels of sovereign debt, severely limited fiscal resources, or combinations thereof. These factors have challenged the effectiveness of many of the typical tools for bank resolution. This publication focuses on the issues raised in systemic crises, not on the resolution of individual bank problems. Based on the lessons learned during the Asian crisis, it updates the IMF’s work on the general principles, strategies, and techniques for managing these crises.

Mr. Richard Hemming, Mr. Axel Schimmelpfennig, and Mr. Michael Kell

Abstract

Fiscal problems have long been considered a central feature of financial--that is, currency, debt, and banking--crises. This paper addresses four questions: What are the fiscal causes of crises? Which fiscal vulnerability indicators help to predict crises? Can fiscal variables explain the severity of crises? And what are the fiscal consequences of crises? Its findings are based on statistical analysis of a large data set of fiscal variables for 29 emerging market economies over 1970-2000 and detailed case studies of 11 emerging market crises during the 1990s that focus on structural and institutional dimensions of fiscal vulnerability.

Ms. Catherine A Pattillo, Mr. Andrew Berg, Mr. Gian M Milesi-Ferretti, and Mr. Eduardo Borensztein

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed an increase in the frequency of currency and balance of payments crises in developing countries. More important, the crises have become more virulent, have caused widespread disruption to other developing countries, and have even had repercussions on advanced economies. To predict crises, their causes must be clearly understood. Two competing strands of theories are reviewed in this paper. The first focuses on the consequences of such policies as excessive credit growth in provoking depletion of foreign exchange reserves and making a devaluation enevitable. The second emphasizes the trade-offs between internal and external balance that the policymaker faces in defending a peg.

Mr. Leslie E Teo, Mr. Charles Enoch, Mr. Carl-Johan Lindgren, Mr. Tomás J. T. Baliño, Ms. Anne Marie Gulde, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

This paper reviews the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand to the Asian crisis that erupted in 1997 and compares the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines, which were buffeted by the crisis. Although work is still under way in all the affected countries, and thus any judgements are necessarily tentative, important lessons can be learned from the various experience of the last two years.

Ms. G. G. Garcia

Abstract

This paper demonstrates a well-designed deposit guarantee system can strengthen incentives for owners, managers, depositors and other creditors, borrowers, regulators and supervisors, and politicians. Borrowers should be aware that they will have to repay their loans if their bank fails and will be encouraged to keep their loans current where offsetting is limited to past-due loans. The performance of insurers, regulators, and supervisors as agents will improve where they know that they can take justifiable actions without political interference and will be held accountable for their actions to their principals. Despite the improvements, and possibly partly because there are issues in deposit insurance design that remain to be resolved, financial crises have been prevalent during the 1990s. This situation has forced a number of countries to offer a blanket guarantee to restore confidence and to allow the continued functioning of the financial system while the authorities take time to design a plan for the resolution of the crisis.

Mr. George A Mackenzie and Mr. Peter Stella

Abstract

Central banks and other public financial institutions act as agents of fiscal policy in many countries. Their "quasi-fiscal" operations and activities can affect the overall public sector balance without affecting the budget deficit as conventionally measured, may also have important allocative effects, and increase the effective size of the public sector. This paper analyzes the macroeconomic and financial effects of such quasi-fiscal activities, as well as the taxes, subsidies, and other expenditures that such activities introduce outside the budget. Measurement and accounting issues are addressed, and policy recommendations are offered.