Archived Series > Economic Issues
Abstract
In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.
Abstract
En casi todas las grandes crisis financieras de la última década --desde Asia oriental a Rusia, TurquÃa y América Latina-- la interferencia polÃtica en la regulación del sector financiero contribuyó a agravar una situación ya de por sà mala. Las presiones polÃticas no solo debilitaron la regulación financiera sino que también impidieron que los órganos reguladores y supervisores tomaran medidas contra los bancos en problemas. En este estudio se investiga por qué, para cumplir con su mandato de preservar la estabilidad del sector financiero, los reguladores y supervisores del sector financiero tienen que ser independientes --de la industria de servicios financieros, asà como del gobierno-- a la vez que deben rendir cuentas.
Abstract
L'ingérence des responsables politiques dans la réglementation et le contrôle du secteur financier a aggravé la quasi-totalité des crises financières majeures de la dernière décennie, de l'Asie de l'Est, à la Russie, en passant par la Turquie et l'Amérique latine. Outre qu'elles affaiblissent la réglementation financière en général, les pressions politiques nuisent au travail des responsables de la réglementation et du contrôle chargés d'intervenir auprès des banques en difficulté. Cette brochure examine les raisons pour lesquelles les régulateurs financiers devraient pouvoir compter sur un large degré d'indépendance, non seulement vis-à -vis de l'État, mais aussi vis-à -vis des sociétés de services financiers, afin de s'acquitter de leur mandat qui est de préserver la stabilité du secteur financier.
Abstract
In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.
Abstract
In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.
Abstract
In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.