The choices we make in advance of the next financial crisis will have a major impact in determining the magnitude of the economic damage. Our vulnerability to crisis depends on the strength of the protections we build into the financial system through prudential regulation, as well as on the degrees of freedom we create for ourselves to respond to the unanticipated, and the knowledge and experience we bring in managing crises. Is the financial system safer today? With the reforms now in place and with the memory of the crisis still fresh, how confident should we feel about the resilience of the financial system and our ability to protect the US economy from a major financial crisis? Warburg Pincus President and former US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner attempts to answer these questions in his October 2016 Per Jacobsson Lecture.
International Monetary Fund. Communications Department
As the Federal Reserve’s statutory objectives are defined as specific goals for the U.S. economy—to pursue maximum sustainable employment and price stability—and its policy decisions are targeted to achieve these dual objectives, there might seem to be little need for its policymakers to pay attention to developments outside the United States. But such an inference would be incorrect: the state of the U.S. economy is significantly affected by the state of the world economy, and of course, actions taken by the Federal Reserve influence economic conditions abroad, which in turn spill back on the evolution of the U.S. economy and therefore must be taken into account in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy choices. This Per Jacobsson Lecture first reviews the effect of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies on the rest of the global economy, particularly emerging market economies. It then addresses prospective outcomes and possible risks associated with the normalization of the Federal Reserve’s policies. Finally, it discusses the Federal Reserve’s responsibilities in the world economy.
Since the grave disruption of the subprime market at the start of the global financial crisis triggered major turbulences in the functioning of money markets in all large advanced economies, central bankers have experienced extraordinarily demanding and difficult times, characterized by a succession of shocks unseen, in the advanced economies, since World War II. Given the structurally very different economies that central banks were dealing with, one could have expected that the shock of the crisis would have accentuated their differences and given rise to an even more diverse setof central bank policies, conceptual references, and measures in a selfish, inward-looking mode. Instead, however, a phenomenon of “practical and conceptual rapprochement” took place between central banks, amidst the economic and financial turmoil, with the closest central bank cooperation ever, as symbolically illustrated by the coordinated decrease of interest rates in October 2008. The crisis also started or accelerated a multidimensional process of convergence of key elements of monetary policy thinking and policymaking—“conceptual convergence”—that is far from being achieved, but calls for great attention from both academia and policymakers. This Per Jacobsson Lecture concentrates on this convergence process, reflecting as well on some theoretical and practical issues that are associated with unconventional monetary policy liquidity and quantitative measures and the forward guidance generalization, themselves part of the conceptual convergence phenomenon.
International Monetary Fund. External Relations Dept.
The future of finance, and in particular saving it from a popular backlash against the global financial crisis and related crisis management policies, has become a matter of great concern. In this brochure, which presents in written form a lecture from the Per Jacobsson Foundation’s lecture series, former Reserve Bank of India Governor Y. V. Reddy explores three interrelated issues of particular concern to central bankers in the search for good finance for the future: how to ensure that the financial sector serves the society better, how to integrate financial sector policies better with national economic policies, and how to ensure that the financial industry functions as a means and not as an end in itself. The question-and-answer session following the lecture is also included in the brochure.
This paper discusses that as the IMF had been designed to assist countries with current account deficits, its role came under discussion. It subsequently regained some importance during the Latin American crises in the 1980s and the emerging market crises in the 1990s. It became apparent that an initially national crisis might very quickly assume a global character by spreading through closely linked financial systems. The global financial system and the global real economy are so intertwined that a financial crisis can severely affect the real economy in both emerging and advanced economies. Emerging economies acted as an important stabilizer at the height of the crisis, whereas major advanced economies are now facing a rather modest outlook for growth. The ultimate objective should be to tackle the roots of the crisis instead of just creating ever more instruments to fight the symptoms. Against this backdrop, any attempt to enhance the IMF's capacity for crisis management has to be thoroughly assessed in terms of costs and benefits.
This paper describes a financial system that should be adopted for the 21st century. The paper highlights that the financial crisis of 2008 has raised fundamental questions about how the financial industry is structured, managed, and regulated. The paper discusses that a well-functioning financial system plays an essential role in generating high levels of saving, promoting the efficient allocation of investment, and smoothing economic fluctuations stemming from nonfinancial causes. By facilitating informed risk taking, it is a key element in achieving optimal levels of productivity growth and rising living standards.
This paper discusses about the fact that longer the recognition problems persist, the greater the risk of continued “active inertia” and disappointing outcomes. The possibility of policy mistakes and business accidents will increase further, it will become harder for industrial country governments to convince their citizenry (as well as decision makers in emerging economies) to participate fully in the formulation and implementation of the required solutions, and multilateral institutions will not be able to fill the growing void at the core of the international system. The innovative financial instruments were potent in lowering barriers to entry to many markets, including important segments of the US housing market. As a result, too many households purchased homes that they could not afford, using exotic mortgages they did not fully understand, and too many small companies took on debt they could not sustain. Prior to the crisis, key industrial countries had embarked upon a multiyear, serial contamination of balance sheets.
The October 2009 Per Jacobsson Lecture, delivered in Istanbul in conjunction with the 2009 Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank, examined the issue of longer-run growth prospects for the global economy following the recent global economic crisis. Will the world be able, in the five to ten years after the crisis abates, to return to the very rapid kind of economic growth sustained in the five years leading up to it? Noting that recent debate on the topic has focused on demand-side factors, neglecting the key area of supply-side sources of growth, Kemal Dervis, the 2009 Per Jacobsson lecturer, argues that contrary to the majority view that limited, below-trend growth is likely to prevail for some time, there is probably potential for very rapid growth in the world economy over the coming decade, thanks to strong supply-side factors. Whether such growth can be realized depends, however, on demand-side management both at the national level and through improved global macroeconomic policy coordination.
This paper focuses on the developing countries, which accounted for nearly half the value of those surpluses, were apparently unable to find sufficiently profitable investments at home that overcame market and political risk. The United States a decade ago likely could not have run up today’s near $800 billion annual deficit for the simple reason that we could not have attracted the foreign savings to finance it. In 1995, for example, total cross-border saving was less than $300 billion. The long-term updrift in this broader swath of unconsolidated deficits and mostly offsetting surpluses of economic entities has been persistent but gradual for decades, probably generations. However, the component of that broad set that captures only the net foreign financing of the imbalances of the individual US economic entities, our current account deficit, increased from negligible in the early 1990s to 6.2 percent of our GDP by 2006.