International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper focuses on the technical note on regulation and supervision of less significant institutions in Belgium. The financial sector assessment program (FSAP) undertook a targeted review of Belgium’s Less Significant Institutions (LSI) and third-country branches (TCBs) banking regulation and supervision. The National Bank of Belgium (NBB) and Financial Services and Markets Authority have well-established processes for prudential, product and conduct supervision of LSIs. While NBB’s overall supervisory approach is adequate, the regulatory framework for corporate governance could be enhanced. Internal decision-making processes and the underpinning of certain decision proposal could in some specific instances be enhanced. With regard to NBB’s internal supervisory processes, some fine-tuning and continued attention could be useful. The NBB should continue to ensure adequate staffing for LSI and TCB supervision and continue to carefully consider how to address any supervisory Information Technology risk concerns. Banks’ internal capital target could usefully be added to the NBB’s internal monitoring. A structured approach for conduct risk and consumer protection information sharing with the FSMA and the Ministry of Economic Affairs should be put in place.
This paper presents Cyprus’ technical assistance report on strengthening the governance and oversight of state-owned enterprises (SOE). Cyprus' government has implemented measures to enhance financial oversight and strengthen the governance of SOEs over several years. The ongoing reforms have already yielded positive results. Additional measures are needed to strengthen SOEs corporate governance and accountability practices. Establishing and regularly updating a consolidated inventory of public entities is essential to ensure SOE accountability. Good SOE governance requires a coordinated and sequential approach to reforms. Coordination among various stakeholders and decision makers is paramount and calls for developing and publishing a reform strategy with benchmarks to track progress. A SOE ownership policy should also be developed. This policy could outline the state's ownership rationale and define the roles and responsibilities of the institutions involved in SOE oversight and governance to provide clarity on the objectives and guidelines for effective ownership and management of SOEs. The policy should set clear accountability lines of respective agencies involved in the SOE ownership, governance, and oversight process. Their responsibilities would depend on the chosen ownership model the government will decide.
This technical assistance report on Zambia discusses the governance and anti-corruption assessment. Acknowledging the need to address corruption, strengthen governance and the rule of law, the President and authorities of Zambia have announced a series of important initiatives. Consistently high fiscal deficits, inefficient public investment and weak controls on spending led to Zambia accumulating large fiscal and external imbalances. In the challenging environment, the authorities sought the IMF’s assistance to analyse governance weaknesses and corruption vulnerabilities and make specific, country-tailored and feasible recommendations to address governance and corruption risks in wide-ranging areas. The report identifies on near-term reform steps and structural policy measures that require more time and resources but are necessary for sustainable change. All recommendations coming out of the diagnostic shall contribute to the formulation of governance and anticorruption policies and programs, improvement of the legal and institutional frameworks, as well as governance and anti-corruption reform measures agreed to in the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Zambia.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
The implementation of a twin peaks model represents a significant change to the South African financial supervisory architecture. The Prudential Authority (PA), operating within the administration of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), is responsible for promoting and enhancing the safety and soundness of financial institutions that provide financial products and securities services. A separate authority, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority2 (FSCA), is responsible for market conduct regulation and supervision. The introduction of the twin peaks architecture was motivated by a need to increase the robustness of the financial sector regulatory and supervisory system, reinforce financial stability, improve protection of customers, and enhance cooperation among the regulators.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
The CBvCSM is the sole supervisory authority for all regulated financial institutions operating locally and in the offshore (or international) sector, as well as the stock exchange in Curacao and St Maarten. The financial sector comprises different types of institutions, which include banks and non-bank institutions, insurance companies (both Life, and Non-life), securities intermediaries, asset management firms, investments institutions, fund administrators, management of pension funds, reinsurers, and trust companies.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This virtual technical assistance (TA) mission supported the Agency in strengthening certain elements of its risk based supervisory framework. The mission focused on assisting the Agency with its development of internal supervisory methodologies for assessing a bank’s ICAAP, and for setting individual Pillar 2 supervisory capital requirements. The mission provided recommendations and targeted training. The priorities for the next TA missions were discussed with the Agency (strengthening banking supervision and cybersecurity, and diagnostic TA of insurance sector supervision will be considered). The mission benefited from simultaneous translation.