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International Monetary Fund
This paper examines how durable goods and financial frictions shape the business cycle of a small open economy subject to shocks to trend and transitory shocks. In the data, nondurable consumption is not as volatile as income for both developed and emerging market economies. The simulation of the model implies that shocks to trend play a less important role than previously documented. Financial frictions improve the ability of the model to match some key business cycle properties of emerging economies. A countercyclical borrowing premium interacts with the nature of durable goods delivering highly volatile consumption and very countercyclical net exports.
Mr. Rabah Arezki and Mr. Akito Matsumoto

.1.1. Energy Cost Share Natural Gas Cost Share (1) Total (2) Direct (3) Total (4) Direct Total Utility Share × price Difference 0.415*** (0.099) Direct Utility Share × price Difference 0.432*** (0.111) Total Nat Gas Share × price Difference 0.423*** (0.099) Direct Nat Gas Share × Price Difference 0.402*** (0.115) Observations 944,135 944,135 944,135 944,135 Adjusted R 2 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.277 Note: Dependent variable is logarithm of the value of product

International Monetary Fund

) C t ≡ ( μ N t − γ + ( 1 − μ ) D t − γ ) − 1 γ , ( 10 ) and 1 1 + γ is the elasticity of substitution between durables and nondurables, µ is the utility share of nondurables, θ is the utility share of consumption, and σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Following our assumptions on the tradability versus nontradability of durables and nondurables, the economy has the following two resource constraints

Jochen M. Schmittmann and Han Teng Chua
Green debt markets are rapidly growing while product design and standards are evolving. Many policymakers and investors view green debt as an important component in the policy mix to achieve the transition to a low carbon economy and ensure the pricing of climate risks. Our analysis contributes to the nascent literature on the environmental impact of green debt by documenting the CO2 emission intensity of corporate green debt issuers. We find lower emission intensities for green bond issuers relative to other firms, but no difference for green loan and sustainability-linked loan borrowers. Green bond, green loan, and sustainability-linked loan borrowers lower their emission intensity over time at a faster rate than other firms.
Jochen M. Schmittmann and Han Teng Chua

Firms by CO2 (Scope 1+2+3)/Assets Buckets %, Financial Year 2019 Sources: BloombergNEF, Reuters, IMF staff calculations Appendix 2: Green Bond Issuers vs Non -Issuers by Industry Figure 29. Financials: Share of Firms by C02 (Scope 1 +2)/Revenue Buckets %, Financial Year 2019 Sources: BloombergNEF, Reuters, IMF staff calculations Figure 30. Utilities: Share of Firms by CO2 (Scope 1+2)/Revenue Buckets %, Financial Year 2019 Sources: BloombergNEF, Reuters, IMF staff calculations Figure 31. Industrials: Share of Firms by CO2

Mr. Ben J. Heijdra and Ms. Jenny E Ligthart

) + t C ( t ) C ( t ) . ( T .7 ) Variabi es : Part L(t) Employment α Pure rate of time preference K(t) Capital stock β Death (=birth) rate(β ≥0) C(t) Aggregate consumption ε L Production share of labor (0 ε L 1) Y(t) Aggregate net output ε C Utility share of consumption W(t) Real wage rate γ o Productivity parameter (γ o > 0) r(t) Real interest rate T(t) Lump-sum transfers

Mr. Natan P. Epstein, Mr. Selim A Elekdag, and Ms. Marialuz Moreno Badia

to fiscal policy. Second, we decrease the share of rule-of-thumb agents in the economy, Ψ, from 0.5 to 0.25. Therefore, by raising the share of forward-looking agents, this modification also increases the effective planning horizon. Third, we make labor supply more inelastic thereby reducing the supply-side effects of fiscal policy (especially to changes in labor income taxes when relevant). We achieve this by changing the utility share of leisure, η, from 0.04 to 0.01. Fourth, and finally, we increase the substitutability between factor of production by imposing

Hollis B. Chenery

.9 34.6 37.9 39.2 39.9 40.4 40.5 40.4 39.3 9. Utilities Share of GDP 4.6 5.7 7.0 7,7 8.3 9.1 9.7 10.2 11.7 III—Population and Labor Force 10. Primary Labor, as % of Total Labor Force 75.3 68.1 58.7 49.9 43.6 34.8 28.6 23.7 8.3 11. Industrial Labor, as % of Total Labor Force 4.1 9.6 16.6 20.5 23.4 27.6 30.7 33.2 40.1 12. Utilities and Services Labor, as % of Total

International Monetary Fund. European Dept.

Sector AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA ITA PRT A. Agriculture Share of SMEs Sample size 0.88 17 1.00 329 0.98 1,286 1.00 103,404 1.00 5,170 1.00 17,128 0.99 31,684 1.00 32,042 C. Manufacturing Share of SMEs Sample size 0.70 4,709 0.89 26,799 0.75 53,743 0.99 740,931 0.97 35,584 0.96 240,852 0.98 603,083 0.99 175,766 D. + E. Electricity and Water Utilities Share of SMEs Sample size 0.71 294 0.88 1,589 0.85 11,233 0.97 24,621 0.98 2,933 0.93 10,810 0.96 25,847 0.97 4,486 F

Mr. Natan P. Epstein, Mr. Selim A Elekdag, and Ms. Marialuz Moreno Badia
Fiscal consolidation has become an important policy prescription for many emerging market countries (EMCs), particularly for the highly indebted ones. Although prudent fiscal policies tend to reduce vulnerabilities, their implementation is usually postponed. This paper represents, to the best of our knowledge, one of the first attempts in the literature to quantify the costs of delaying fiscal consolidation in an EMC. In particular, using the IMF's Global Fiscal Model (GFM), we find that early consolidation through expenditure cuts would result in a substantial increase in Israel's long-term output growth relative to the case with delayed fiscal adjustment. Using an alternative fiscal instrument, we find that delaying tax cuts would result in cumulative real GDP that is much larger than otherwise.