Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 185 items for :

  • "uninsured depositor" x
Clear All
Mr. George G. Kaufman and Mr. Steven A. Seelig

collapse of other firms. The risk of such actual or perceived damage is often a popular justification for explicit or implicit government-provided or sponsored safety nets under banks, including explicit deposit insurance and implicit government guarantees, such as “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF), that may protect de jure uninsured depositors and possibly other bank stakeholders against some or all of the loss. 2 But even with such guarantees, bank failures still invoke widespread fear. In part, this reflects a concern that protected and/or unprotected depositors may not

Mr. George G. Kaufman and Mr. Steven A. Seelig
Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While the sources and implications of losses at resolution have been analyzed previously, the sources and implications of losses after resolution have received little attention. This paper examines the causes of delayed depositors' access to their funds at resolved banks, describes how the FDIC provides immediate access, reports on a special survey of access practices in other countries, and analyzes the costs and benefits of delayed access in terms of both the effects on market discipline and depositor pressure to protect all deposits.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
This 2013 Article IV Consultation examines the performance of Sweden’s fiscal policies to counter effects of global financial crisis. Economic growth in Sweden has been moderate since global financial crisis of 2008–2009. The IMF report posits that with potential growth moderately weaker and the natural rate of unemployment to remain elevated, policies should focus on growth-enhancing reforms, especially in the labor market. It suggests that good policies that secure the soundness of Swedish international banking groups are expected to benefit borrowers not only in Sweden but across the region.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.

contingencies, the realization of such contingent liabilities can lead to large increases in public debt. As recent episodes have indicated, the scope of the government bailout of the banking sector may only cover insured depositors, or may additionally extend to uninsured depositors, and even unsecured creditors (as in Ireland in 2008). Such uncertainty about the extent of the government bailout makes estimating the size of contingent liabilities very difficult. In Sweden, a discussion has begun on how to ensure the framework’s countercyclicality as well as the absence of an