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Cover IMF Working Papers
Institutional Inertia
Ms. Laura Valderrama
We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other, leading to institutional inertia.
Keywords:
WP; political economy; adverse selection; credit union
Cover IMF Working Papers
Institutional Inertia
Ms. Laura Valderrama

to making an inefficient technology choice. We therefore ask two questions. First, what is the role of the firm’s legal form (or ownership structure) on the efficiency of technology choice? Second, whenever the status quo legal form leads to inefficiency, will a change in the legal form take place as a mechanism to restore efficiency? Regarding the first question, we show that a systematic technological bias emerges contingent on the firm’s ownership structure. Regarding the latter, we show that the answer is no: an inefficient legal form can persist even if

Keywords:
WP; political economy; adverse selection; credit union
Cover FinTech Notes
Behind the Scenes of Central Bank Digital Currency: Emerging Trends, Insights, and Policy Lessons
Gabriel Soderberg, Ms. Marianne Bechara, Wouter Bossu, Ms. Natasha X Che, Sonja Davidovic, Mr. John Kiff, Ms. Inutu Lukonga, Mr. Tommaso Mancini Griffoli, Tao Sun, and Akihiro Yoshinaga
Central banks are increasingly pondering whether to issue their own digital currencies to the general public, so-called retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). The majority of IMF member countries are actively evaluating CBDCs, with only a few having issued CBDCs or undertaken extensive pilots or tests. This paper shines the spotlight on the handful of countries at the frontier in the hope of identifying and sharing insights, lessons, and open questions for the benefit of the many countries following in their footsteps. Clearly, what can be gleaned from these experiences does not necessarily apply elsewhere. The sample of countries remains small and country circumstances differ widely. However, the insights in this paper may inspire further investigation and allow countries to gain time by building on the experience of others. Importantly, the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the courses taken by different jurisdictions, but to study and discuss their key experiences and lessons. The paper studies six advanced CBDC projects, drawing on collaboration and exchanges with the respective central banks to get insights beyond what has previously been published. Unless a specific published source is cited, all information stems from interviews and workshops with members of CBDC project teams in each jurisdiction.
Keywords:
digital currency; central banks; fintech; CBDC; cross-border payments; distributed ledger technology; off-line capacity; anonymity; Sand Dollar; e-CNY; DCash; e-krona; e-peso; technology supplier; ensuring resilience; CBDC communication; technology choice; central bank representative; Central Bank digital currencies; Currencies; Blockchain and DLT; Caribbean
Cover IMF Working Papers