This paper analyzes the transmission of shocks and policies among and across the Nordic economies and the rest of the world. This spillover analysis is based on a pair of estimated structural macroeconometric models of the world economy, disaggregated into thirty five national economies. We find that the Nordic economies are heavily exposed to external macroeconomic and financial shocks, but have significant scope to mitigate their domestic macroeconomic impacts through coordinated policy responses, given their high degree of regional integration.
This paper uses a novel variant of identification through hetroscedacity to estimate spillovers across U.S., Euro area, Japanese, and UK government bond and equity markets in a vector autoregression. The results suggest that U.S. financial shocks reverberate around the world much more strongly than shocks from other regions, including the Euro area, while inward spillovers to the U.S. from elsewhere are minimal. There is also evidence of two-way spillovers between the UK and Euro area financial markets and spillovers from Europe to Japan. The results also suggest that the uncertainty about the direction of causality of contemporaneous correlations—an issue that other techniques cannot tackle—is the dominant source of uncertainty in the estimated impulse response functions.
This paper finds that financial spillovers from China to regional markets are on the rise. The main transmission channel appears to be trade linkages, although direct financial linkages are playing an increasing role. Without an impact on global risk premiums, China’s influence on regional markets is not yet to the level of the United States, but comparable to that of Japan. If China-related shocks are coupled with a rise in global risk premiums, as in August 2015 and January 2016, spillovers to the region could be significantly larger. Over the medium term, China’s financial spillovers could rise further with tighter financial linkages with the region, including through the ongoing internationalization of the renminbi and China’s capital account liberalization.