Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 27 items for :

  • "scenario exercise" x
Clear All
International Monetary Fund

present scenario exercise, imports are treated as principally determined by export earnings and the availability of financing. During 1981–83, the rate of growth of imports was constrained by the weak export performance of most developing countries and the shrinking of available financing from international banks. This constraint, although now somewhat eased, will to some degree remain in effect during 1985–87, so that exports plus bank financing were felt to be a better indicator of import growth than developing country GDP, and the income elasticities of imports

International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.

the growth of productive capacity (e.g., inappropriate relative prices and unduly low real interest rates), resulting in an average annual rate of growth of real GDP for indebted developing countries that is more than 1 percentage point lower than in the baseline scenario. Among regions, the largest fall in growth rates occurs in Asia, and the smallest, in the Western Hemisphere ( Chart III-5 ). Cross-Scenario Comparisons The differences among scenarios with regard to the growth of output provide some of the more striking contrasts in the scenario exercise

Mr. Frank Hespeler and Felix Suntheim
This note analyzes the stress experienced (and caused) by open-end mutual funds during the March COVID-19 stress episode, with a focus on global fixed-income funds. In light of increased valuation uncertainty, funds experienced a short period of intense withdrawals while the market liquidity of their holdings deteriorated substantially. To cover redemptions, afflicted funds predominantly shed liquid assets first—for example, cash, cash equivalents, and US Treasury securities. But forced asset sales amplified price pressures in markets and contributed to liquidity falling across fixed-income markets. This drop in market liquidity, as well as the general stress in financial markets, may have led to fund investors becoming even more sensitive to challenging portfolio performance and encouraged further withdrawals. Only after central banks intervened, directly and indirectly supporting asset managers, did liquidity and redemption stress subside. Overall, the March episode validated the financial-stability concerns about liquidity vulnerabilities in the fund industry and calls for further action to address them.
Mr. Frank Hespeler and Felix Suntheim
This note analyzes the stress experienced (and caused) by open-end mutual funds during the March COVID-19 stress episode, with a focus on global fixed-income funds. In light of increased valuation uncertainty, funds experienced a short period of intense withdrawals while the market liquidity of their holdings deteriorated substantially. To cover redemptions, afflicted funds predominantly shed liquid assets first—for example, cash, cash equivalents, and US Treasury securities. But forced asset sales amplified price pressures in markets and contributed to liquidity falling across fixed-income markets. This drop in market liquidity, as well as the general stress in financial markets, may have led to fund investors becoming even more sensitive to challenging portfolio performance and encouraged further withdrawals. Only after central banks intervened, directly and indirectly supporting asset managers, did liquidity and redemption stress subside. Overall, the March episode validated the financial-stability concerns about liquidity vulnerabilities in the fund industry and calls for further action to address them.
International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.

in Developing Countries Judgments concerning the impact of policies in developing countries on economic outcomes are an important element underlying the medium-term scenario exercise. Two of the “variant” scenarios presented are based on the assumption that the policy stance of industrial countries remains the same as under the baseline scenario, while that of the developing countries varies in “better” or “worse” directions. The results of these scenarios give some indication of whether developing countries’ own policies have an appreciable effect on their

Mr. Peter Doyle, Mr. Guorong Jiang, and Louis Kuijs

. But the growth-scenario exercise also highlights three closely related uncertainties about whether that potential will be realized. These uncertainties have significant implications for the policy frameworks that will be most appropriate in the run up to and after EU accession. Box 3.3. Investment Ratios and Capital Intensity: Italy 1960s; Spain 1970s In 1960, Italian GDP per capita was a little below that attained by the CEC5 in the mid-1990s. During the 1960s, GDP growth in Italy averaged 6 percent, total employment declined marginally, and the share of

Anthony Lanyi

. 3 In U.S. dollars. 4 Includes trade financing. Underlying this scenario, also, is an important set of assumptions concerning the availability of external Financing for developing countries as a whole. This assumption constitutes a kind of constraint for the entire scenario exercise, as it specifies maximum flows of financing available to all developing countries but does not specify projections for individual countries or groups of countries; these were carried out by the economists who prepared the projections for individual countries upon which the

Mr. Guorong Jiang, Mr. Peter Doyle, and Louis Kuijs

levels derived from the Benhabib and Spiegel equation, the accelerated growth shown implicitly emanates entirely from increasing the capital intensity of output. These results indicate that in most cases investment would need to rise substantially from the levels seen in the recent past, and considerable extra effort would be required to mobilize domestic savings to finance such investment. 38. These results suggest that the CEEC-5 have the potential for rapid growth. But the growth-scenario exercise also highlights three closely related uncertainties about whether