The speeches made by officials attending the IMF–World Bank Annual Meetings are published in this volume, along with the press communiqués issued by the International Monetary and Financial Committee and the Development Committee at the conclusion of the meetings.
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II. Channels Through Which Tariffs Act as a Tax on Exports
A. Effects on Relative Prices of Goods
B. Tariffs and Cost of Inputs
C. Evidence From Existing Studies
III. Quantifying Export Disincentives That Arise from Import Tariffs in Developing Countries
A. Estimates of Export-Tax Equivalents
B. Role of Nontariff Barriers in Influencing Export Disincentives
C. Effects of Rich-CountryBarriers Against Developing
What must each of us do?
Let me start with the rich countries.
Deliver on the Doha agenda. We know that rich-countrybarriers to trade are too high. Bring down the tariffs and cut back the nontariff barriers that all too often are covert protectionism. Keep to the Doha timetable. But there is so much that can be done by rich countries without waiting for Doha
We know that agricultural subsidies in rich countries, at $1 billion per day, squander resources and profoundly damage opportunities for poor countries to invest in their own development
This paper points out that while many developing countries seek to increase their export earnings, they have not embraced fully the notion that their own pattern of import protection hurts their export performance. The paper quantifies the extent to which import protection acts as a tax on a country's export sector and finds that for many developing countries, the magnitude of the implicit tax is substantial-about 12 percent, on average, for the countries studied. The paper also illustrates the effects of various tariff-cutting scenarios in the Doha Round on export incentives and concludes that, in general, developing countries could increase their export earnings by reducing their own import tariffs, but countries must be careful about how these tariff reductions are achieved. For example, tariff-cutting schemes that exempt certain sectors could actually be harmful.
world and domestic prices, although the precise magnitude depends on the size of the AVE of the NTB.
C. Effects of Rich-CountryBarriers Against Developing Country Exports
While trade barriers erected by rich countries do restrain exports from developing countries, the anti-export bias from many developing countries’ own import protection is often quantitatively more important . The extent to which rich-countrybarriers discourage developing-country exports is demonstrated by simulations using a global model of world trade that takes into account tariff