issue is the question of whether the central banking institution should be subject, in the last resort, to the decisions of the central executive office of government. The orthodox view would be that monetary policy, as an important lever of power, should ultimately be subject to democratic sanction; while the central banking institution may be given a separate voice in policy debate, the final voice should belong to the representativegovernment. The opposing view would emphasize that monetary policy—like the administration of justice—must be able to resist undue
IMF lending is generally conditional on specified policies and outcomes. These conditions usually are negotiated compromises between policies initially favored by the Fund and by the country's authorities. In some cases the authorities might be satisfied enough with the outcome to take responsibility for it ("own" it) even though it was not their original preference. In other cases, they might accept the outcome only to obtain financing, in which case weak commitment might lead to poor implementation. This paper reviews the theoretical basis for the importance of ownership, summarizes what is known about its empirical effects, and suggests a strategy for strengthening it.