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K. Burke Dillon

Abstract

This paper describes developments in multilateral official debt renegotiations over the 18 months up to the end of June 1986.1 The most important development in recent multilateral debt renegotiations has been the increased attention paid by debtors and creditors to the impact of Paris Club reschedulings, and the terms of those reschedulings, on new credit flows to debtor countries. To facilitate the return to normal market access for countries considered to have made substantial progress in their adjustment efforts, official creditors recently concluded multiyear rescheduling agreements (MYRAs) with both Ecuador and Côte d’Ivoire.2 Official creditors have also indicated that they were prepared to grant an extended consolidation period for Yugoslavia, although in this case a further meeting would be necessary to agree on the terms for the second stage of the rescheduling.

International Monetary Fund

Abstract

This paper describes developments in multilateral official debt renegotiations over the 18 months up to the end of June 1986. To facilitate the return to normal market access for countries considered to have made substantial progress in their adjustment efforts, official creditors recently concluded multiyear rescheduling agreements (MYRAs) with both Ecuador and Cote d'Ivoire. Official creditors have also indicated that they were prepared to grant an extended consolidation period for Yugoslavia, although in this case a further meeting would be necessary to agree on the terms for the second stage of the rescheduling. The tendency toward increased differentiation in terms according to the circumstances of the debtor country, already apparent in 1983–1984, has been carried further during the last 18 months. Indeed, the rescheduling agreements concluded during this recent period tend to fall fairly clearly into two very different groups. Official multilateral debt renegotiations deal with the rescheduling of debt service payments on loans extended by, or guaranteed by, the governments or the official agencies of the participating creditor countries.

K. Burke Dillon

Abstract

Official multilateral debt renegotiations deal with the rescheduling of debt service payments on loans extended by, or guaranteed by, the governments or the official agencies of the participating creditor countries. They are normally, though not exclusively, undertaken under the aegis of the Paris Club. The Club has neither a fixed membership nor an institutional structure; rather it represents a set of practices and procedures that have evolved since the first such ad hoc meeting was convened for Argentina in 1956. Meetings are open to all official creditors that accept those practices and procedures.

K. Burke Dillon

Abstract

Paris Club negotiations give special importance to the principle that the debtor should seek comparable treatment from its various creditors and with respect to all types of debt, and comparability provisions have long been a standard feature in Paris Club Agreed Minutes. By and large, creditors fall into one of five broad categories: multilateral lending institutions, official creditors participating in the Paris Club, nonparticipating official creditors, commercial banks, and nonguaranteed private suppliers. Paris Club creditors expect the debtor to negotiate comparable reschedulings with all other creditor groups to which it has significant debt service obligations, with the exception of multilateral lending institutions, whose preferential status has long been accepted by official creditors.

Mr. Peter M Keller

Abstract

This paper describes developments in multilateral official debt renegotiations over the 18 months through December 1987. The most important new departure in multilateral official debt renegotiations was the adaptation of policies by Paris Club creditors in response to the protracted problems of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries at the same time that other initiatives were launched for low-income countries, including the proposal for enhancement of the IMF’s structural adjustment facility. Official creditors have generally preserved concessional interest rates in the restructuring of official development assistance (ODA) loans; moreover, for the poorest debtors, some creditors have converted such loans into grants. The question of interest concessions on other categories of debts rescheduled by the Paris Club was raised, inter alia, by the Venice summit but no consensus exists among creditors for changing the current practice. By regularly excluding short-term debt from reschedulings, debtors and creditors have also frequently succeeded in protecting the flow of short-term trade financing, which is often vital to the financing of an IMF-supported program.

Mr. Peter M Keller

Abstract

This paper describes developments in multilateral official debt renegotiations over the 18 months through December 1987. The most important new departure in multilateral official debt renegotiations was the adaptation of policies by Paris Club creditors in response to the protracted problems of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries at the same time that other initiatives were launched for low-income countries, including the proposal for enhancement of the IMF’s structural adjustment facility. Official creditors have generally preserved concessional interest rates in the restructuring of official development assistance (ODA) loans; moreover, for the poorest debtors, some creditors have converted such loans into grants. The question of interest concessions on other categories of debts rescheduled by the Paris Club was raised, inter alia, by the Venice summit but no consensus exists among creditors for changing the current practice. By regularly excluding short-term debt from reschedulings, debtors and creditors have also frequently succeeded in protecting the flow of short-term trade financing, which is often vital to the financing of an IMF-supported program.

Mr. Peter M Keller

Abstract

This paper describes developments in multilateral official debt renegotiations over the 18 months through December 1987. The most important new departure in multilateral official debt renegotiations was the adaptation of policies by Paris Club creditors in response to the protracted problems of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries at the same time that other initiatives were launched for low-income countries, including the proposal for enhancement of the IMF’s structural adjustment facility. Official creditors have generally preserved concessional interest rates in the restructuring of official development assistance (ODA) loans; moreover, for the poorest debtors, some creditors have converted such loans into grants. The question of interest concessions on other categories of debts rescheduled by the Paris Club was raised, inter alia, by the Venice summit but no consensus exists among creditors for changing the current practice. By regularly excluding short-term debt from reschedulings, debtors and creditors have also frequently succeeded in protecting the flow of short-term trade financing, which is often vital to the financing of an IMF-supported program.

International Monetary Fund

Abstract

This paper describes developments in multilateral official debt renegotiations over the 18 months through December 1987. The most important new departure in multilateral official debt renegotiations was the adaptation of policies by Paris Club creditors in response to the protracted problems of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries at the same time that other initiatives were launched for low-income countries, including the proposal for enhancement of the IMF’s structural adjustment facility. Official creditors have generally preserved concessional interest rates in the restructuring of official development assistance (ODA) loans; moreover, for the poorest debtors, some creditors have converted such loans into grants. The question of interest concessions on other categories of debts rescheduled by the Paris Club was raised, inter alia, by the Venice summit but no consensus exists among creditors for changing the current practice. By regularly excluding short-term debt from reschedulings, debtors and creditors have also frequently succeeded in protecting the flow of short-term trade financing, which is often vital to the financing of an IMF-supported program.