Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 6 of 6 items for :

  • "offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program" x
Clear All
Ms. Dora Benedek, Martin Grote, Grace Jackson, Maksym Markevych, Mr. Christophe J Waerzeggers, and Ms. Lydia E Sofrona
This note explores the conditions, design elements, and implementation considerations of a successful voluntary disclosure program (VDP), including its compliance with anti–money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) international standards. The note emphasizes that such a program must be offered in the context of a considerably strengthened and credible enforcement capacity—one that is explicitly publicized to taxpayers—to avoid undermining tax morale.
Ms. Dora Benedek, Martin Grote, Grace Jackson, Maksym Markevych, Mr. Christophe J Waerzeggers, and Ms. Lydia E Sofrona

posing a huge administrative burden for the already stretched tax administration. Collection should be swift. The possibility for installments posed high risks for collection, and some taxpayers were excluded from the program for not following up on their payment obligations—the law provided for the reversal of the offered incentives in this case. Annex III. Administrative Lessons from South African Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP) Some of the aspects of the South African Offshore VDP that were found to be impractical and impeded the effective

Ms. Dora Benedek, Martin Grote, Grace Jackson, Maksym Markevych, Mr. Christophe J Waerzeggers, and Ms. Lydia E Sofrona

Awareness and Reporting Obligations E. The Issue of Facilitators V. Conclusions Annex I. Cross-Country Comparison of Specials (Offshore) VDPs Annex II. The Greek Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP) Annex III. Administrative Lessons From South African Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP) References

Sebastian Beer, Maria Delgado Coelho, and Sebastien Leduc
We analyze the impact of exchange of information in tax matters in reducing international tax evasion between 1995 and 2018. Based on bilateral deposit data for 39 reporting countries and more than 200 counterparty jurisdictions, we find that recent automatic exchange of information frameworks reduced foreign-owned deposits in offshore jurisdictions by an average of 25 percent. This effect is statistically significant and, as expected, much larger than the effect of information exchange upon request, which is not significant. Furthermore, to test the sensitivity of our findings, we estimate countries’ offshore status and the impact of information exchange simultaneously using a finite mixture model. The results confirm that automatic (and not upon request) exchange of information impacts cross-border deposits in offshore jurisdictions, which are characterized by low income tax rates and strong financial secrecy.
Sebastian Beer, Maria Delgado Coelho, and Sebastien Leduc

skepticism that FATCA has generated anything close to the amount of revenue initially anticipated. FATCA was projected to generate $8.7 billion in revenue between fiscal years 2010–2020 (Joint Committee on Tax), a yearly average of $792 million. The limited information that is publicly-available suggests that FATCA may not have lived up to its hype. For example, since the launch of the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, a partial amnesty program that allows persons not under audit to disclose unreported offshore activities and benefit from reduced civil and criminal

International Monetary Fund

still need to share information promptly. Some countries also effectively exempt crypto-asset investment gains from taxes, with potential spillovers onto other countries’ tax bases. International coordination on information sharing, such as on residents’ foreign bank accounts, is necessary for enforcing capital taxation. Without information, tax authorities lack a cost-effective mechanism to protect the tax system, and tax audits generally fail to detect of-shore income and assets. Ad hoc unilateral enforcement initiatives and occasional offshore voluntary