industries whose production value is higher at international prices. The economy-wide nominal wage reductions needed to regain competitiveness are estimated at 0.9 percent in the euro area for a shock in textiles. Wage declines are more marked in textile exporting countries, reaching 1 ½ on average in Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece, against only 0.4 percent in Germany. If the productivity shock occurs in machinery, euro area nominal wages decline by 1.3 percent relative to baseline. The burden of adjustment now falls on Germany, Austria and France where wage losses
procyclical or, in the case of real wage growth (not shown), acyclical in downturns. In other words, wages are overall downward rigid, consistent with the sector-level results. Before and after the reform . The downward rigidity of wages is driven by the pre-reform period. Allowing slope coefficients to differ pre and post-reform suggest that the change in wage dynamics after the reforms if statistically significant. After the reform, nominal wages decline in response to negative employment growth instead of staying constant as before and they even decline following
payment with productivity. The reforms were adopted in a staggered approach over 2011–13, though with delays (see Annex 1 ). 8 Reforms aimed at increasing labor market decentralization and flexibility. As a result, sectoral/occupational agreements declined, while firm-level agreements became more prominent. This allowed businesses to also adjust through prices (instead of just volume, i.e. layoffs), reducing economy-wide wage costs (following the decline in public wages). Private sector nominal wages declined by 20 percent from 2009 to 2015 while the ULC-adjusted real
wages declined, further denting private consumption. Exports . The collapse of global trade severely impacted the Baltics because some of their primary trading partners—the Nordic countries and Russia—had also been disproportionally hard hit by the crisis. The Baltics’s REERs appreciated as many trading partners’ currencies depreciated sharply against the euro. While the decline of exports was steep (some 27 percent between Q3 2008 and Q3 2009), their overall contribution to the drop in GDP was less than domestic demand. Figure 3. Output Declines in the World