The behavior of equity prices is analyzed in a general equilibrium model where agents have preferences not only over consumption but also (implicitly) over their beliefs. To alleviate cognitive dissonance, investors endogenously choose to ignore information that conflicts too much with their ex ante expectations. Depending on the new information that is released, systematic overvaluation and undervaluation of equity prices arise, as well as too much and too little equity price volatility. The distortion in the asset pricing process is closely related to the precision of the information.
Mr. Francis X. Diebold and Mr. Peter F. Christoffersen
Imposing cointegration on a forecasting system, if cointegration is present, is believed to improve long-horizon forecasts. Contrary to this belief, at long horizons nothing is lost by ignoring cointegration when the forecasts are evaluated using standard multivariate forecast accuracy measures. In fact, simple univariate Box-Jenkins forecasts are just as accurate. Our results highlight a potentially important deficiency of standard forecast accuracy measures—they fail to value the maintenance of cointegrating relationships among variables—and we suggest alternatives that explicitly do so.
Within a unified theory for stocks and corporate bonds, based on dynamic optimization by investors, this paper derives analytical expressions for the momentary distributions of expected price, respectively known to approximate lognormal with systematic deviations (high peak, fat tail) and double exponential (for credit risk). Market equilibrium is regarded as a dynamic equilibrium characterized by a time-invariant probability distribution over microfinancial states, marginal redistributions of portfolios are regarded as indistinguishable, and real and fiat assets are regarded as essentially distinct. The formalism provides a basis for decomposing value changes by market fundamentals, investor sentiment, and investor acquisition of securities.
This paper presents and then tests a political economy model to analyze the observed positive relationship between income inequality and inflation. The model's key features are unequal access to both inflation-hedging opportunities and the political process. The model predicts that inequality and 'elite bias' in the political system interact to create incentives for inflation. The paper's empirical section focuses on this predicted interaction effect. The identification strategy involves using the end of the Cold War as a source of exogenous variation in the political environment. It finds robust evidence in support of the model.
This paper evaluates the bias of the least-squares-with-dummy-variables (LSDV) method in fiscal reaction function estimations. A growing number of studies estimate fiscal policy reaction functions-that is, relationships between the primary fiscal balance and its determinants, including public debt and the output gap. A previously unexplored methodological issue in these estimations is that lagged debt is not a strictly exogenous variable, which biases the LSDV estimator in short panels. We derive the bias analytically to understand its determinants and run Monte Carlo simulations to assess its likely size in empirical work. We find the bias to be smaller than the bias of the LSDV estimator in a comparable autoregressive dynamic panel model and show the LSDV method to outperform a number of alternatives in estimating fiscal reaction functions.