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Bertrand Gruss, Mrs. Sandra V Lizarazo Ruiz, and Mr. Francesco Grigoli
Anchoring of inflation expectations is of paramount importance for central banks’ ability to deliver stable inflation and minimize price dispersion. Relying on daily interest rates and inflation forecasts from major financial institutions in the United States, we calculate monetary policy surprises of individual analysts as the unexpected changes in the federal funds rate before the meetings of the Federal Reserve Board. We then assess the effect of monetary policy surprises on the dispersion of inflation expectations, a proxy for the extent of anchoring, which is based on the same analysts’ inflation projections submit-ted after the Fed meetings. With an identification strategy that hinges on a tight window around the Fed meetings, we find that monetary policy surprises lead to an increase in the dispersion of inflation expectations up to nine months after the policy meeting. We rationalize these results with a partial equilibrium model that features rational expectations and sticky information. When we allow the degree of information rigidity to depend on the realization of firm-specific shocks, the theoretical results are qualitatively consistent and quantitatively close to the empirical evidence.
Bertrand Gruss, Mrs. Sandra V Lizarazo Ruiz, and Mr. Francesco Grigoli

Anchoring of inflation expectations is of paramount importance for central banks’ ability to deliver stable inflation and minimize price dispersion. Relying on daily interest rates and inflation forecasts from major financial institutions in the United States, we calculate monetary policy surprises of individual analysts as the unexpected changes in the federal funds rate before the meetings of the Federal Reserve Board. We then assess the effect of monetary policy surprises on the dispersion of inflation expectations, a proxy for the extent of anchoring, which is based on the same analysts’ inflation projections submit-ted after the Fed meetings. With an identification strategy that hinges on a tight window around the Fed meetings, we find that monetary policy surprises lead to an increase in the dispersion of inflation expectations up to nine months after the policy meeting. We rationalize these results with a partial equilibrium model that features rational expectations and sticky information. When we allow the degree of information rigidity to depend on the realization of firm-specific shocks, the theoretical results are qualitatively consistent and quantitatively close to the empirical evidence.

Juan Angel Garcia and Aubrey Poon
This paper incorporates market-based inflation expectations to the growing literature on trend inflation estimation, and finds that there has been a significant decline in euro area trend inflation since 2013. This finding is robust to using different measures of long-term inflation expectations in the estimation, both market-based and surveys. That evidence: (i) supports the expansion of ECB’s UMP measures since 2015; (ii) provides a metric to monitor long-term inflation expectations following their introduction, and the likelihood of a sustained return of inflation towards levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term
Szilard Benk and Max Gillman
Real oil prices surged from 2009 through 2014, comparable to the 1970’s oil shock period. Standard explanations based on monopoly markup fall short since inflation remained low after 2009. This paper contributes strong evidence of Granger (1969) predictability of nominal factors to oil prices, using one adjustment to monetary aggregates. This adjustment is the subtraction from the monetary aggregates of the 2008-2009 Federal Reserve borrowing of reserves from other Central Banks (Swaps), made after US reserves turned negative. This adjustment is key in that Granger predictability from standard monetary aggregates is found only with the Swaps subtracted.
Athanasios Orphanides, Spencer Dale, and Pär Österholm
Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. There is a risk that the central bank can distract the public; this means that the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public's understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information.
This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing.
International Monetary Fund
This paper develops a simple model for measuring potential output that uses data on inflation, unemployment, and capacity utilization. We apply the model to 10 countries, in addition to the United States and the euro area. While there is a substantial amount of uncertainty around our estimates, we find that the financial crisis has resulted in a reduction in potential output.
Mr. David A Vines and Sven Jari Stehn
We analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New-Keynesian model with public debt and inflation persistence. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that optimal discretionary policy is subject to a 'debt stabilization bias' which requires debt to be returned to its pre-shock level. This finding has two important implications for optimal discretionary policy. Firstly, as Leith and Wren-Lewis have shown, optimal monetary policy in an economy with high steady-state debt cuts the interest rate in response to a cost-push shock - and therefore violates the Taylor principle. We show that this striking result is not true with high degrees of inflation persistence. Secondly, we show that optimal fiscal policy is more active under discretion than commitment at all degrees of inflation persistence and all levels of debt.
Mr. Christopher W. Crowe
I test whether inflation targeting (IT) enhances transparency using inflation forecast data for 11 IT adoption countries. IT adoption promotes convergence in forecast errors, suggesting that it enhances transparency. This effect is robust to dropping observations, is strengthened by using instrumental variable estimation to eliminate mean-reversion, and is absent in placebo regressions (where IT adoption is shifted by a year). This result supports Morris and Shin's (2002) contention that better public information is most beneficial for forecasters with bad private information. However, it does not support their hypothesis that better public information could make private forecasts less accurate.