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Ian W.H. Parry, Mr. Simon Black, and Nate Vernon

31 by apportioning country-level data on traffic fatalities into external versus internal risks, monetized them using the above approach for mortality valuation, extrapolating non-fatality accident costs to other countries from several country case studies, and expressing the result per unit of fuel use (making adjustments for the km-based portion of fuel price elasticities). Coady and others (2019) updated accident externalities with more recent traffic fatality data and these estimates are used after updating to 2020 for fatality/injury valuations. Finally

Ian W.H. Parry, Victor Mylonas, and Nate Vernon

these out to 2030, and computes the environmental, fiscal, and economic impacts of alternative policies using assumptions about fuel price elasticities, emission and mortality rates associated with different fuels, and extensions of standard formulas for economic welfare impacts. Incidence impacts are assessed by feeding policy-induced changes in energy prices into an input-output table for India indicating price and cost changes for a wide range of consumer products and industries and then linking the results to a survey of household expenditures on different

Ian W.H. Parry, Victor Mylonas, and Nate Vernon
Spreadsheet models are used to assess the environmental, fiscal, economic, and incidence effects of a wide range of options for reducing fossil fuel use in India. Among the most effective options is ramping up the existing coal tax. Annually increasing the tax by INR 150 ($2.25) per ton of coal from 2017 to 2030 avoids over 270,000 air pollution deaths, raises revenue of 1 percent of GDP in 2030, reduces CO2 emissions 12 percent, and generates net economic benefits of approximately 1 percent of GDP. The policy is mildly progressive and (at least initially) imposes a relatively modest cost burden on industries.
Ian W.H. Parry, Mr. Chandara Veung, and Mr. Dirk Heine
This paper calculates, for the top twenty emitting countries, how much pricing of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is in their own national interests due to domestic co-benefits (leaving aside the global climate benefits). On average, nationally efficient prices are substantial, $57.5 per ton of CO2 (for year 2010), reflecting primarily health co-benefits from reduced air pollution at coal plants and, in some cases, reductions in automobile externalities (net of fuel taxes/subsidies). Pricing co-benefits reduces CO2 emissions from the top twenty emitters by 13.5 percent (a 10.8 percent reduction in global emissions). However, co-benefits vary dramatically across countries (e.g., with population exposure to pollution) and differentiated pricing of CO2 emissions therefore yields higher net benefits (by 23 percent) than uniform pricing. Importantly, the efficiency case for pricing carbon’s co-benefits hinges critically on (i) weak prospects for internalizing other externalities through other pricing instruments and (ii) productive use of carbon pricing revenues.
Mr. David Coady, Ian W.H. Parry, Nghia-Piotr Le, and Baoping Shang
This paper updates estimates of fossil fuel subsidies, defined as fuel consumption times the gap between existing and efficient prices (i.e., prices warranted by supply costs, environmental costs, and revenue considerations), for 191 countries. Globally, subsidies remained large at $4.7 trillion (6.3 percent of global GDP) in 2015 and are projected at $5.2 trillion (6.5 percent of GDP) in 2017. The largest subsidizers in 2015 were China ($1.4 trillion), United States ($649 billion), Russia ($551 billion), European Union ($289 billion), and India ($209 billion). About three quarters of global subsidies are due to domestic factors—energy pricing reform thus remains largely in countries’ own national interest—while coal and petroleum together account for 85 percent of global subsidies. Efficient fossil fuel pricing in 2015 would have lowered global carbon emissions by 28 percent and fossil fuel air pollution deaths by 46 percent, and increased government revenue by 3.8 percent of GDP.
Ian W.H. Parry, Victor Mylonas, and Nate Vernon
Ian W.H. Parry, Victor Mylonas, and Nate Vernon
Following submission of greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation commitments or pledges (by 190 countries) for the 2015 Paris Agreement, policymakers are considering specific actions for their implementation. To help guide policy, it is helpful to have a quantitative framework for understanding: i) the main impacts (on GHGs, fiscal balances, the domestic environment, economic welfare, and distributional incidence) of emissions pricing; ii) trade-offs between pricing and other (commonly used) mitigation instruments; and iii) why/to what extent needed policies and their impacts differ across countries. This paper provides an illustrative sense of this information for G20 member countries (which account for about 80 percent of global emissions) under plausible (though inevitably uncertain) projections for future fuel use and price responsiveness. Quantitative results underscore the generally strong case for (comprehensive) pricing over other instruments, its small net costs or often net benefits (when domestic environmental gains are considered), but also the potentially wide dispersion (and hence inefficiency) in emissions prices implied by countries’ mitigation commitments.
Ian W.H. Parry and Mr. Jon Strand

) 0.02 0.07 congestion 0.04 0.10 accidents 0.06 0.07 noise 0.00 0.01 road damage 0.00 0.08 Fuel demand elasticity -0.50 -0.50 Milage to fuel price elasticity 0.50 0.60 Fuel economy elasticity 0.25 0.20 Sources: See text and Appendix II for documentation Table 2. Corrective Tax Computations: Benchmark Parameter Values (Year 2006 Dollars) Gasoline Diesel Corrective fuel tax, $/gal. 2.35 2.09 Contribution of

Ian W.H. Parry and Mr. Jon Strand
Gasoline and diesel fuel are heavily taxed in many developed and some emerging and developing countries. Outside of the United States and Europe, however, there has been little attempt to quantify the external costs of vehicle use, so policymakers lack guidance on whether prevailing tax rates are economically efficient. This paper develops a general approach for estimating motor vehicle externalities, and hence corrective taxes on gasoline and diesel, based on pooling local data with extrapolations from U.S.evidence. The analysis is illustrated for the case of Chile, though it could be applied to other countries.
Ian W.H. Parry, Victor Mylonas, and Nate Vernon

, assuming (for transparency of comparisons) no new mitigation policies. The environmental, fiscal, and economic welfare impacts of carbon pricing and other mitigation instruments are then computed, with all policies (again for transparency) scaled to impose the same explicit or implicit CO 2 price, 9 and using assumptions for fuel price elasticities, emission rates, and local externalities (e.g., air pollution mortality). Incidence analysis is also conducted for Canada, China, India, and the United States 10 by linking the model to input-output tables and household