Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 47 items for :

  • "euro area-U.K." x
Clear All
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.

migrants from Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta living in the U.K is considerable, accounting for roughly 10 percent of these countries’ population. Regarding migration from the U.K. to the euro area, there is one U.K. migrant living in the euro area for every four to five hundred euro area citizens. However, the U.K. migrant population is larger in Ireland, Luxembourg, and Spain. 3 What Do the Stylized Facts Suggest of the Potential Impacts of Brexit? 5. The strength of euro area-U.K. integration implies that there would be no Brexit winners . First, the U.K. is among

Ms. Sonali Jain-Chandra, Min Jung Kim, Sung Ho Park, and Jerome Shin

Front Matter Page Asia and Pacific Department Contents I. Introduction II. Korea’s Linkages to International Banks: Stylized Facts III. Effect of Foreign Bank Deleveraging on Korea: Evidence from a DSGE Model A. Model Description B. Impulse Responses IV. The Transmission of the 2008 Crisis to Korean Banks: Regression Analysis V. Conclusion References Figures 1. Stock of Consolidated Foreign Claims to Euro Area, U.K., U.S., and Japan Banks 2. Consolidated Foreign Claims of European and U.S. Banks on Selected Asian Economies

International Monetary Fund

domestic corporate sector . Foreign banks have significant claims on the Philippines, in particular the corporate sector which accounts for about 40 percent of the total claims. The aggregate claims of euro area, U.K., and U.S. banks are of similar size at about 4 percent of GDP each. French, German, and Dutch banks account for almost all euro area claims. To a large extent the claims are funded locally, mitigating the risks of foreign bank retrenchment. Remittances 11. During the past decade remittances from Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) have grown at about

Mr. Paul Cashin, Mr. Kamiar Mohaddes, and Mr. Mehdi Raissi

driver of the global economy over the past couple of decades, it is not surprising to observe a non-trivial (though smaller) spillover from China to other systemic economies, with average elasticities being −0.12, −0.04, and −0.07 percent for the euro area, U.K., and the U.S., respectively. 7 It appears that countries with large trade exposures to China are most vulnerable to negative shocks to China’s GDP. These results are consistent with Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012) , who investigate the impact of China’s emergence in the world economy on Latin American countries

Mr. Waikei R Lam
This paper explores the determinants of Japanese banks’ overseas expansion and assesses whether the growing cross-border activity will continue under the new macroeconomic policies referred as “Abenomics”. The analysis finds that Japanese banks are well positioned to scale up foreign exposures, thanks to their relative resilient balance sheets and continued growth in the region. Stronger domestic growth in Japan could mitigate the pace, but is unlikely to reverse the expansion as global and regional pull-factors play a more prominent role in the growth of cross-border claims. Increasing cross-border activity could pose funding risks and supervisory challenges and require continued close monitoring.
Mr. Paul Cashin, Mr. Kamiar Mohaddes, and Mr. Mehdi Raissi
China's GDP growth slowdown and a surge in global financial market volatility could both adversely affect an already weak global economic recovery. To quantify the global macroeconomic consequences of these shocks, we employ a GVAR model estimated for 26 countries/regions over the period 1981Q1 to 2013Q1. Our results indicate that (i) a one percent permanent negative GDP shock in China (equivalent to a one-off one percent growth shock) could have significant global macroeconomic repercussions, with world growth reducing by 0.23 percentage points in the short-run; and (ii) a surge in global financial market volatility could translate into a fall in world economic growth of around 0.29 percentage points, but it could also have negative short-run impacts on global equity markets, oil prices and long-term interest rates.
Ms. Sonali Jain-Chandra, Min Jung Kim, Sung Ho Park, and Jerome Shin
Korea was hit hard by the 2008 global financial crisis, with the foreign bank deleveraging channel coming prominently into play. The global financial crisis demonstrated that a sharp deleveraging can be transmitted to emerging markets through the bank lending channel to a slowdown in credit growth. The analysis finds that a sharp decline in external funding led to relatively modest decline in domestic credit by Korean banks, due to concerted policy efforts by the government in 2008. Impulse responses from a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model calibrated to Korea shows that it appears better prepared to handle such shocks relative to 2008. Indeed, Korea is much more resilient to such shocks due to the efforts by the authorities, which has led to the strengthening of external buffers, such as higher foreign exchange reserves and bilateral and multilateral currency swap arrangements.
International Monetary Fund
Spain’s 2007 Article IV Consultation underlies that immediate growth prospects are bright and the central scenario is for a smooth landing but with appreciable downside risks. The Spanish economy enjoyed another year of remarkable growth in 2006, further extending its prolonged expansion. Output growth gathered pace in the course of 2006 to reach 3.9 percent for the year, and brisk job creation absorbed further increases in female participation and immigration, and inflation moderated appreciably.