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Mr. George G. Kaufman and Mr. Steven A. Seelig
Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While the sources and implications of losses at resolution have been analyzed previously, the sources and implications of losses after resolution have received little attention. This paper examines the causes of delayed depositors' access to their funds at resolved banks, describes how the FDIC provides immediate access, reports on a special survey of access practices in other countries, and analyzes the costs and benefits of delayed access in terms of both the effects on market discipline and depositor pressure to protect all deposits.
Mr. George G. Kaufman and Mr. Steven A. Seelig

or loss-sharing amount. For de facto uninsured depositors, the value of their claim is the present value of the estimated eventual pro-rata recovery value of the bank’s assets, which is likely to be less than the par value. Although losses to depositors in bank failures at the time of resolution have been frequently analyzed in the literature, the implications of losses after resolution from delayed depositor access through the freezing of insured and/or uninsured accounts have not been thoroughly analyzed. Because the magnitude and timing of the losses to

Mr. George G. Kaufman and Mr. Steven A. Seelig

Front Matter Page Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department Authorized for distribution by David S. Hoelscher Contents I. Introduction II. Sources of Potential Losses to Depositors III. Implications of Post-Resolution Delayed Depositor Access to Funds IV. Reducing Potential Losses to Depositors V. Procedures for Immediate and Full Payment of Depositor Claims at Resolution VI. History of Immediate and Full Payments of Depositor Claims VII. Disadvantages of Immediate and Full Payment of Depositor Claims VIII. Modeling the Access Delay

International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper first describes the architecture for resolution and crisis management. Second, it outlines the resolution policies and operational arrangements currently in place. Third, it discusses the measures taken by the authorities to ensure resolvability. Fourth, it refers to cross-border cooperation issues in resolution. Finally, it describes frameworks for resolution funding and deposit insurance. The U.K. financial safety net is underpinned by strong institutional arrangements. The financial safety net is made up of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. The authorities are encouraged to continue their efforts to operationalize, test, and refine the crisis preparedness framework, while exploring mechanisms to make it even more robust.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
An important aspect of the FSAP mission was the review of the bank crisis resolution framework in Moldova. There are several characteristics of vulnerabilities in the banking system which suggests the need for the authorities to give a high priority to crisis resolution preparedness. Notable in this context is the concentrated nature of the banking system, being dominated by six domestic banks (four of which are relatively large): the six banks, which de facto appear to form two groups of banks (involving five of the six largest domestic banks) having combined market share of 60–70 percent of banking system assets. In the case of two of these banks there is a significant large exposure risk, with aggregate large exposures being well in excess of the banks’ capital. These banks also have relatively large exposure risk to foreign banks. Moreover, stress testing undertaken for the FSAP suggests a potential vulnerability to credit risks, particularly as regards foreign currency denominated loans.
International Monetary Fund
The Czech financial system is confronted with mounting risks that stem mainly from negative developments in the European Union (EU). This technical note focuses on crisis management and bank resolution framework for the Czech Republic. It summarizes the high-level observations of the mission based on its key findings and recommendations, and analyzes the existing institutional framework and coordination arrangements for crisis management. The note also examines the cross-border dimension of crisis preparedness and crisis management tools.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
Korea experienced significant financial distress in the late 1990s along with some of its Asian neighbors. The authorities’ experience in handling this crisis and the experience in handling the fallout from the global financial crisis in 2007–08 helped them establish a broad crisis management framework in Korea. Improving and formalizing the framework for crisis management would help preserve and build upon institutional memory. Authorities can consider formally setting up an apex forum for leading the inter-agency cooperation and coordination work on crisis preparedness and crisis management. With a view to avoid duplication, the authorities may consider upgrading the Macroeconomic Financial Meeting (MEFM) with participation by the heads of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), Financial Services Commission (FSC), Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), Bank of Korea (BOK), and Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) as members, and by including crisis preparedness and crisis management as an explicit mandate. The essential elements of a financial safety net are available in Korea, and the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) framework and deposit insurance system can be improved to make the safety net more responsive. For ELA, this can be achieved by reviewing and revising the legal and procedural aspects to remove any scope for delays in actual disbursement of funds. For deposit insurance system, improvements can be made by bringing the deposit insurance fund out of deficit, and assuring a back-up funding. The financial safety net is well supported by an efficient framework of financial sector supervision. While the corrective action framework has some of the main elements in place it can, among others, be improved in the following areas for better effectiveness: (a) reviewing the triggers for corrective actions and improving their objectivity to enable timely intervention, including even before banks breach regulatory thresholds; and (b) putting in place norms and guidance determining the use of the powers to postpone or suspend corrective actions.
Israel Fainboim Yaker and Sailendra Pattanayak
A treasury single account (TSA) is an essential tool for consolidating and managing governments’ cash resources, thus minimizing borrowing costs. In countries with fragmented government banking arrangements, the establishment of a TSA should receive priority in the public financial management reform agenda. Drawing on the lessons of the Fund’s work in several countries in establishing a TSA, this paper explains its concept, essential features, and potential benefits. It also presents alternative models and approaches for designing a TSA that take into account specific country contexts as well as the preconditions and desirable sequencing for its successful implementation. Finally, the paper includes country examples from different regions in support of the analysis and recommendations.
International Monetary Fund
This paper on the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) on Djibouti explains economic developments and policy discussions. Djibouti faces important challenges to reduce widespread poverty. Since the mid-1990s, the government has been engaged in adjustment and reform programs to restore macroeconomic stability and achieve sustainable economic growth. The proposed policies and reforms should be sufficient to achieve the SMP’s objectives. Overall, the program will test the authorities’ resolve to implement policy reforms. Steps have been taken as part of prior actions to control the wage bill and improve transparency.
Ms. G. G. Garcia
A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee.