This section provides the background studies relating to dimensions of Fund policy on conditionality. Appendix 1 provides a review of Fund experience with coordination, both in a low-income country (LIC) setting (in African programs) and in an emerging market and advanced economy setting in the European Union (EU) and Euro Area (EA). Appendix 2 summarizes the recent changes to debt limits in LICs and provides an assessment of the implementation of this policy in the early stages (up to mid-February 2011). Appendix 3 reviews the experience of countries with the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and Precautionary Credit Line (PCL)-supported programs. Appendix 4 examines the impact of the 2009 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation on program design
emerging and advanced economies. The same was observed in the 2008 TSR.
➣ Perceived traction of Fund surveillance is high overall, but similarly varies across country groups. Overall more than 70 percent of countryauthorityrespondents indicate that recent Article IV consultations have generated policy debate to at least some extent, and more than 60 percent appropriate policy changes to at least some extent. But traction is higher for LICs than for emerging and advanced economies.
➣ Perceived value added remains uneven across policy areas. The contribution of
Board in this area.
Only a minority of Board and authorities consider existing system of oversight of financial audit, control, and risk management and internal financial audit and control to be adequate.
Only 48 percent of Board respondents and 32 percent of the member countryauthorityrespondents considered existing arrangements and practices for internal financial audit and control to be adequate to ensure the IMF’s fiduciary health. Fifty-five percent of the Board respondents and 39 percent of the member countryauthority
International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office
specific research, principally as an outreach vehicle to engage in a dialogue with regional policymakers. In fact, country authorities and others explained that REOs had limited value added over the WEO as a vehicle for such purpose.
Also, more authorities across all country groups in the survey compared with the interviews reported reading the REO .
Between 20 and 25 percent of emerging economy and ECF-eligible authority survey respondents said they used SIPs “very frequently,” while 8 percent of advanced countryauthorityrespondents reported
International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office
Executive Board to staff positions largely relate to issues of urgency and sequencing, with Directors generally favoring a more cautious approach to implementing exchange-rate-related policy advice.
With regard to discussions between staff and authorities, 70 percent of the countryauthorityrespondents indicated that—in areas that had been a focus of policy attention—the authorities and the IMF agreed on the analysis (suggesting either that IMF staff were convinced by the authorities; that IMF advice—to the extent it was given—convinced the authorities; or that
At the recent Review of the Fund’s Transparency Policy on June 24, 2013, the Executive Board agreed to further consider options to reduce the time lag for public access to Executive Board meeting minutes under the Open Archives Policy. Although a majority of Executive Directors saw scope for reducing the time lag for public access to Board meeting minutes from five years to three years, a significant minority of Directors favored maintaining the existing lag in order to strike a balance between informing the public about the Board’s views and maintaining the candor of Board discussions. The Board requested that staff undertake further analysis of the issue. Accordingly, this paper provides a more detailed assessment of the current practice and a discussion of the potential costs and benefits of possible options for further reform.
Review consider ways to make Board meeting minutes more quickly and easily accessible to the public. This view was also supported by Civil Society Organizations during outreach for the 2013 review. In contrast, results of surveys undertaken in the context of the recent review suggested that most of the membership remained broadly satisfied with the lag for Board meeting minutes—only 33 percent of countryauthorityrespondents and 14 percent of Executive Director respondents thought that the five-year time period for public access to the minutes of Board meetings was
countryauthorities’ respondents, 93 percent feel that collaboration has led to better coverage of reform areas and two-thirds of these respondents report that collaboration has reduced the number of program conditions. In line with these results, slightly over 90 percent of these respondents perceive that collaboration has improved the focus on critical reform areas ( Figure 3-C ).
Figure 3. Coverage and Consistency of Conditionality 1/
1/ All figures are in percent of respondents.
25. Some 61 percent of the authorities’ responses indicate that the
The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), established in 1999, is an in-depth assessment of a country’s financial sector. It is an important element of the Fund’s surveillance and provides input to the Article IV consultations. In developing and emerging market countries, FSAP assessments are usually conducted jointly with the World Bank and include two components: a financial stability assessment (the main responsibility of the Fund) and a financial development assessment (the main responsibility of the World Bank). Each FSAP concludes with the preparation of a Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA), which focuses on issues of relevance to IMF surveillance and is discussed by the IMF Executive Board normally together with the country’s Article IV staff report. Since the program’s inception, 144 member countries have requested and undergone FSAPs, most of them more than once. In recent years, the Fund has been conducting 14–16 FSAPs per year at an annual cost of US$13–15 million. The last review of the FSAP in 2009, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, introduced a number of far-reaching reforms that have clarified the responsibilities of the Fund and the Bank in developing and emerging market countries, where assessments usually take place jointly, established institutional accountability, strengthened the analytical focus and coverage of FSAPs, and introduced the option of modular assessments that has afforded the Fund and national authorities greater flexibility on the scope and timing of assessments. In 2010, the financial stability assessment under the FSAP in 25 jurisdictions with financial sectors deemed by the Fund to be systemically important became a mandatory part of Article IV surveillance, expected to take place every five years. The list was expanded to 29 jurisdictions in 2013. For all other jurisdictions, FSAP participation continues to be voluntary.In 2010, the financial stability assessment under the FSAP in 25 jurisdictions with financial sectors deemed by the Fund to be systemically important became a mandatory part of Article IV surveillance, expected to take place every five years. The list was expanded to 29 jurisdictions in 2013. For all other jurisdictions, FSAP participation continues to be voluntary.
of prioritization and sequencing. About 60 percent of respondents agreed that FSAP recommendations were feasible with a reasonable effort from the authorities. Indeed, respondents indicated that about one-third of FSAP recommendations were fully implemented, with almost all of the remaining two-thirds partially implemented. 11 The main reason given by countryauthorityrespondents for non- or incomplete implementation of FSAP recommendations was disagreement over their relevance and, to a lesser extent, disagreement about their degree of priority or insufficient