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International Monetary Fund
This report focuses on the Monetary Statistics Component of the Regional Data Module Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). The report reveals that with respect to the prerequisites of quality and assurances of integrity, the legislation broadly supports mandatory data reporting and the confidentiality of the reported data. However, the ECCB’s responsibility for compiling and disseminating monetary statistics to the public is not clearly specified in the law. Regarding resources, the number of staff allocated to the compilation of monetary statistics is inadequate.
International Monetary Fund

countries. However, the timeliness of the dissemination of the data on broad money and credit aggregates for the ECCU does not accord with GDDS recommendations. Monetary statistics are reconcilable over the periods for which they are disseminated; however, some inconsistencies exist in the accounts of commercial banks vis-à-vis the central bank and the commercial banks’ interbank positions. The consistency between the monetary statistics and other macroeconomic statistics is assured by using monetary data as an input for other statistical systems. The revisions policy and

International Monetary Fund

consistency problems in the accounts of commercial banks vis-à-vis the central bank and the interbank commercial banks’ positions. Improve the verification procedures of disseminated information to ensure the consistency of the data among corresponding accounts of the ECCB and commercial banks. Training of staff in IMF SRFs and development of links between SRFs and call forms will improve the consistency of data. Revision policy and practice Users are not informed about revised nature of data. Studies and analyses of revisions are not provided to the public

International Monetary Fund

had virtually disappeared (and has recently turned positive in response to forward interventions aimed at stemming a baht appreciation). The maturity and currency mismatch in commercial banks vis-à-vis nonresidents, which was at the heart of Thailand’s 1997 crisis, has practically disappeared . In June 1997, about one-quarter of commercial bank’ liabilities, i.e., some $49 billion were foreign liabilities, of which $29 billion fell due in the short term. With liquid foreign assets (cash and deposits at foreign banks) of only $3 billion, the sector’s potential

Mr. Eduardo Valdivia-Velarde and Ms. Tamara Razin

details. 5 Assets in this paragraph generally refer to fixed assets and other assets that are capital in nature (see BPM6 , paragraph 12.13). 6 See 2008 SNA , paragraph 22.101. 7 The salaries are oft en transferred to local bank accounts (increase in liabilities of the local commercial bank vis-à-vis the nonresident staff, and at the same time increase in banks’ foreign currency assets).

Ekhard Brehmer

open market paper are relatively limited, and the indebtedness of the commercial banks vis-à-vis the Bundesbank has been low since 1957. In these circumstances, forward market policy in Germany appears to have been designed largely to supplement official open market operations by neutralizing the impact of balance of payments surpluses on the money market; that is, forward market policy has been used primarily as a money market instrument. 5 This conclusion is suggested also by the form of intervention chosen by the Bundesbank. 7 When the scope for international

Ms. Anna Shabunina, Mr. Julio Escolano, and Jaejoon Woo

measures the relative importance of commercial banks vis-à-vis the central bank. Higher values of this measure indicate that commercial banks have a larger role in financial intermediation relative to official credit—an indicator of financial development. King and Levine (1993) and Beck et al. (2000) find positive relationship between this indicator and economic growth. Private credit (as percent of GDP) extended to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions (from Beck, et al. ( 2000 , updated 2010)). This measure is typically

International Monetary Fund

disseminated data on broad money and credit aggregates for the ECCU does not meet GDDS recommendations. 4.2 Consistency X There are consistency problems in the accounts of commercial banks vis-à-vis the central bank and the commercial banks’ interbank positions. 4.3 Revision policy and practice X Users are not informed about the revised nature of the data. Studies and analyses of revisions are not provided to the public. 5. Accessibility 5.1 Data accessibility X The ECCB does not disseminate data based on a

Mr. Ashraf Khan
Drawing on the 2016 update of the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database, this paper examines differences in central bank legal frameworks before and after the Global Financial Crisis. Examples from select countries show that many central bank laws have undergone changes in objectives, decision-making, accountability, and data collection. A wider cross-country survey illustrates the common occurrence of price stability in central bank objectives, and varying practices in defining financial stability, “independence” versus “autonomy,” and who within a central bank determines monetary policy. The highlighted facts illustrate the uses of the database and could be a starting point for further analyses.
Mr. Ashraf Khan

(Russia, and Mauritius), and increased disclosures in general (Canada, Mexico, Pakistan, Israel, Mauritius). In the case of Mauritius, a complaint mechanism for commercial banks vis-à-vis the central bank is introduced. In Malaysia, the Secretary General of the Treasury is explicitly allowed to participate in financial stability meetings relating to individual institutions. (4) Central banks are mandated to collect more, and more specific, data and information . This often relates to the expansion of their objectives and/or functions, for instance, Russia (direct