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International Monetary Fund

intended at ensuring more effective coordination at an operational level. 3 In September 2000, the heads of the two institutions set out a shared vision for close cooperation. 4 These agreements have built a framework for Bank-Fund cooperation that recognizes the shared principles of commitment to country ownership, the importance of a coherent approach to supporting country priorities based on an efficient division of labor, and the need to focus and streamline conditionality. 2. Strengthened Framework for Bank-Fund Staff Collaboration. In August 2001, the Boards

International Monetary Fund


This annual publication is a record of the IMF's Annual Meeting and contains the opening and closing addresses of the Chairman of the Board of Governors, presentation of the Annual Report by the Managing Director, statements of Governors, committee reports, resolutions, and a list of delegates. Usually published in March.

Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda

year ago, when I became Chairman of the Development Committee, there was great concern that Bank-Fund cooperation was insufficient on many important issues. Now I am pleased to report that such is no longer the case, as the Bank and the Fund have cooperated closely on many common institutional challenges facing them in this past year.

International Monetary Fund

. Fiscal Policy D. Monetary Policy and Banking E. Structural Reforms III. Nature and Reasons for the Fund’s Long-Term Engagement IV. Lessons and Challenges Going Forward A. Program Ownership B. Bank-fund Cooperation C. Key Challenges V. Strategy for Future Fund Engagement VI. Reaction of the Authorities Figures 1. Selected EU Accession Countries: Comparison of Economic Indicators, 2002 2. Key Macroeconomic Variables 3. Real Effective Exchange Rates 4. Consolidated General Government 5. Total Employment in 86 Monitored SOEs 6

International Monetary Fund

Engagement” (3/25/2004). 2 As underscored in the staff report, it took the Fund almost seven years to recognize the need to address the issue of vested interests through front-loaded structural conditionality. Thus, staff is right when it suggests that the emphasis on macro-based conditionality in the first three Fund-supported programs postponed the emergence of sustained growth. It is also worth mentioning the weaknesses staff identified in the programs' design when it analyzed Bank-Fund cooperation (see paragraphs 43, 44 and 45). In addition to the weak

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

PRSPs, which had been the main organizing process for Bank-Fund cooperation in low-income countries over the prior decade. Lessons from experience have indicated that collaboration works best where there are clear and complementary institutional mandates, defined links to core Fund and Bank activities, and a shared understanding of respective staff roles and responsibilities. This update report served as an input for the subsequent Executive Board discussions on a new approach to documenting poverty reduction strategies that anchor IMF-supported programs in low

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

reflect serious problems in Bank-Fund cooperation or better prioritization of structural reforms by both institutions. In any case, these developments run contrary to the expectation that the Bank would lead the work in non-macro core areas, while the Fund would reduce its involvement. This finding raises questions on how the Fund should address critical reforms in IMF non-core areas, particularly when the World Bank is not addressing them. 45. The evaluation findings are not fully consistent with the aims of the CG, since (i) the number of structural conditions did

International Monetary Fund. Secretary's Department

development. The Bank and the Fund are increasingly able, within their areas of competence and respective mandates, to assist a growing number of member countries to tackle corruption and develop effective administrative and financial systems. My fellow Governors, the Fund’s and the Bank’s role on issues related to governance should contribute to the achievement of effective development. A concrete example of enhanced Bank-Fund cooperation is the HIPC Initiative, which is a striking development and a radical departure from past attempts to address the debt problems of