Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 37 items for :

  • "WEO revision" x
Clear All
Metodij Hadzi-Vaskov, Mr. Luca A Ricci, Alejandro Mariano Werner, and Rene Zamarripa

key drivers explaining the WEO growth revisions? Third, how do WEO revisions compare to Consensus Forecast revisions? Fourth, is there mean reversion/persistence in WEO growth forecasts? And lastly, how do the results vary across time-horizons and country groupings? Our empirical analysis offers several findings. First, growth revisions in vintages closer to the actual are generally larger, more volatile, and more negative. Second, on average, WEO growth revisions are in the right direction. Third, growth revisions in systemic economies are relevant for growth

Metodij Hadzi-Vaskov, Mr. Luca A Ricci, Alejandro Mariano Werner, and Rene Zamarripa
This paper investigates the performance of the IMF WEO growth forecast revisions across different horizons and country groups. We find that: (i) growth revisions in horizons closer to the actual are generally larger, more volatile, and more negative; (ii) on average, growth revisions are in the right direction, becoming progressively more responsive to the forecast error gap as horizons get closer to the actual year; (iii) growth revisions in systemic economies are relevant for growth revisions in all country groups; (iv) WEO and Consensus Forecast growth revisions are highly correlated; (v) fall-to-spring WEO revisions are more correlated with Consensus Forecasts revisions compared to spring-to-fall revisions; and (vi) across vintages, revisions for a given time horizon are not autocorrelated; within vintages, revisions tend to be positively correlated, suggesting perception of persistent short-term shocks.
Ms. Ghada Fayad and Mr. Roberto Perrelli

. Emerging Markets Recovery from Global Financial Crisis 3. Incidence of Deceleration Spells in Emerging Markets 4. WEO Revisions to Real GDP Growth 5. Output Gap Estimates Based on Pre-crisis Period Versus Full Sample Period 6. Factors Contributing to EM Growth Surprises, 2011–13 7. Factors Contributing to EM Growth Slowdowns, 2011–13 8. Trading Partners’ Import Demand Volumes, 2011–13 9. Change in Fiscal Impetus, 2011–13 10. Decomposition of Sources of Slowdowns by Country, 2011–13 Tables 1. Determinants of Growth Surprises in Emerging Market

Ali Alichi, Hayk Avetisyan, Mr. Douglas Laxton, Shalva Mkhatrishvili, Armen Nurbekyan, Lusine Torosyan, and Hou Wang

Estimates Figures 1. Real GDP Dynamics after the Two Recessions 2. Unemployment Rate in the Two Recessions 3. Employment in the Two Recessions 4. Monetary Policy in the Two Recessions 5. Federal Budget Deficit in the Two Recessions 6. Inflation in the Two Recessions 7. WEO Revisions of Actual and Potential Output 8. Efficiency of Matching between Vacancies and Workers Before and 9. Sectoral Employment after the Great Recession 10. Sectoral Employment after the Volcker Disinflation 11. Unemployment Duration 12. Illustrative Effects of Business

Mr. Alvar Kangur, Koralai Kirabaeva, Jean-Marc Natal, and Simon Voigts

. Comparison to WEO Revisions V. RELEVANCE TO MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION FORECAST VI. RELEVANCE TO FISCAL POLICY OUTCOMES VII. CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES BOXES 1. Nominal Wage Rigidities, Hysteresis, and Output Gap Estimates 2. Real-Time Output Gap Assessments in International Organizations 3. GDP Growth Forecast Errors Across WEO Vintages 4. Fiscal Outcomes and Real Time Output Gap Bias FIGURES 1. Real-Time Output Gaps Through WEO Vintages 2. Inflation and Real-Time Output Gaps TABLES 1. Descriptive Statistics of Revisions to WEO

Mr. Douglas Laxton, Mr. Dirk V Muir, Mr. Michael Kumhof, Susanna Mursula, and Charles Freedman

Borrower Riskiness V. Short-Run Fiscal Multipliers A. Increase in Government Investment Expenditures B. Increase in General Lump-Sum Transfers C. Increase in Targeted Lump-Sum Transfers D. Decrease of the Labor Income Tax Rate VI. Effects of Announced G20 Fiscal Stimulus Packages VII. Long-Run Effects of the Accumulation of Public Debt VIII. Concluding Remarks References Figures 1. WEO Revisions to US GDP, Inflation and Interest Rates since April 2007 2. United States: Net Worth, Liabilities, and Risky Spread 3. U.S. Persistent

Mr. Paolo Dudine, Sibabrata Das, Ms. Pritha Mitra, Yongzheng Yang, Eteri Kvintradze, and Miss Nkunde Mwase

26 The database includes observations on macrovariables from October 2007, October 2008, and April 2009 WEO revisions covering the period 2006–10. Each WEO vintage includes different actual and projection periods. For example, October 2007 WEO observations include actual observations for 2006 and projections for 2007–10. As actual data become available in subsequent WEO revisions, both actual observations and projections are updated. Thus, the April 2009 WEO revision includes actual observations for 2006–08 and projections for 2009–10 (and beyond

Metodij Hadzi-Vaskov, Mr. Luca A Ricci, Alejandro Mariano Werner, and Rene Zamarripa

are relevant for growth revisions in all country groups; (iv) WEO and Consensus Forecast growth revisions are highly correlated; (v) fall-to-spring WEO revisions are m o re correlated with Consensus Forecasts revisions compared to spring-to-fall revisions; and (vi) across vintages, revisions for a given time horizon are not autocorrelated; within vintages, revisions tend to be positively correlated, suggesting perception of persistent short-term shocks. JEL Classification Numbers: E17, E37, F47 Keywords: Economic forecasts, Forecast revisions, Growth forecasts

Alexandra Fotiou and Andresa Lagerborg

, and the WEO revisions vis-a-vis the January 2020 vintage of the WEO. 17 We also consider the impact on Covid-19 fiscal support packages using data from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor database. The Role of Covid-19 Deaths We find that countries with higher Covid-19 death rates experienced relatively worse economic performance, while having insignificantly different fiscal out-turns. Tables 8 and 9 show that countries with more significant Covid-19 outbreaks, as measured by cumulative Covid-19 deaths per capita, saw: (i) larger downward growth forecast revisions

Mr. Alvar Kangur, Koralai Kirabaeva, Jean-Marc Natal, and Simon Voigts
We study the properties of the IMF-WEO estimates of real-time output gaps for countries in the euro area as well as the determinants of their revisions over 1994-2017. The analysis shows that staff typically saw economies as operating below their potential. In real time, output gaps tend to have large and negative averages that are largely revised away in later vintages. Most of the mis-measurement in real time can be explained by the difficulty in predicting recessions and by overestimation of the economy’s potential capacity. We also find, in line with earlier literature, that real-time output gaps are not useful for predicting inflation. In addition, countries where slack (and potential growth) is overestimated to a larger extent primary fiscal balances tend to be lower and public debt ratios are higher and increase faster than projected. Previous research suggests that national authorities’ real-time output gaps suffer from a similar bias. To the extent these estimates play a role in calibrating fiscal policy, over-optimism about long-term growth could contribute to excessive deficits and debt buildup.