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Ms. Anja Baum, Mr. Paulo A Medas, Alberto Soler, and Mouhamadou Sy
Ensuring that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are efficient and managed prudently is important for economic and social reasons. It is also crucial to contain fiscal risks and reduce the burden on taxpayers from recurrent and large bailouts. Governments need to develop stronger capacity to monitor and mitigate the risks from SOEs. We present a risk tool to benchmark the performance of SOEs relative to their peers and assess their vulnerabilities, including through stress tests. A strategy to mitigate risks requires the right incentives for managers to perform and for government agencies to conduct effective oversight. Incorporating SOEs in overall fiscal targets would promote greater fiscal discipline and transparency.
Ian M. Hume and BRIAN PINTO

privatization is either unnecessary or can be infinitely delayed. On the contrary, by taking the initiative, many companies have enhanced their viability and increased their value as privatizable assets, while some have not. In the case of Poland—where there are different privatization tracks for companies of different degrees of viability—this divergence of experience may make it easier to identify which track will suit which company. Evidently, hard budgets and import competition—key ingredients of Poland’s reform program—can lead SOE managers to restructure companies

International Monetary Fund. African Dept.

into regional monopolies; and (2) setting rewards and penalties through the regulatory framework to induce the companies to operate efficiently and pass on gains to consumers through lower prices. 11 Safeguards to protect private producers from government opportunistic behavior were also introduced. Collaboration between the government and SOE Managers . SOEs’ response to appropriate incentives ultimately depends on whether SOE managers have the freedom, means, and accountability to improve performance. SOE managers need to be able to adjust staff levels, seek

International Monetary Fund. African Dept.

, 2019. The staff team comprised Messrs. Wieczorek (head), Kumah, and Wocken, and Ms. Devine (all AFR), Mr. Best (SPR), and Ms. Randall (resident representative). Mr. Bernard Jappah (OED) participated in the former discussions. Mr. Mendy and Ms. Njie (res. rep. office in Banjul) assisted the mission, and Mr. Norat (AFR) supported the team from the headquarters. The team met with Finance Minister Njie, Central Bank Governor Jammeh, other senior government officials and SOE managers, parliamentarians, representatives of the private sector, civil society organizations

International Monetary Fund. European Dept.

companies where the state plans to retain control should be significantly reduced. Performance criteria set for SOE managers should aim at performance comparable to that of private companies and should encourage disposal of the non-core assets owned by the SOEs. Moreover, changes to facilitate greater equity financing and reduce the job-skills mismatch would also invigorate employment and investment. Slovenia: Selected Economic Indicators, 2011–17 (Annual percentage change, unless noted otherwise) Est. Projections 2011 2012 2013

Mary Shirley

performance and implicit expectations about, for example, the powers of the regulator. Regulatory contracts are being increasingly used as monopolies in telecommunications (telecoms), electricity, and transport are privatized; the study found seven such contracts for basic telecoms service, the sector that was investigated. Public managers Performance contracts set targets for SOE managers to attain. Many also provide bonuses for management and workers based on achievement and pledge the government to provide greater autonomy or meet other obligations. To determine

Mr. S. Nuri Erbas and Mr. Alan A. Tait
Excess wages tax (EWT) is a tax-based incomes policy instrument introduced in many centrally-planned economies and still used in some FSU and Eastern European countries in transition. The main macroeconomic goal of EWT is to curb inflationary pressures by penalizing through taxation the “excessive” wage awards granted by enterprises in the course of wage and price liberalization. In this paper, effects of EWT on the behavior of a profit-maximizing enterprise under monopsony, its incidence on wages and profits, and its impact on inflation are analyzed. The effect of EWT on an enterprise that maximizes workers’ income is also examined with some observations on EWT’s impact on managerial behavior. Finally, recent experience with EWT is assessed and compared to that suggested by the model.