This paper presents Detailed Assessment of the United States’s implementation of the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. The general preconditions for effective securities regulation in the United States are present. The legal and accounting system supports the implementation of requirements and effective regulation of market participants. The legislation regarding bankruptcy, insolvency, and winding up in the jurisdiction and the professionals associated with those matters are sophisticated.
such well-heeled, sophisticated investors choose to invest in a hedge fund that provides its investors with little information should not trigger more SECoversight. Neither the complexity of hedge fund strategies nor the fact that hedge fund investors may lose money because of fraud or risky trading is grounds for more hedge fund regulation. To the contrary, the risk of loss incentivizes investors to do the kind of due diligence that positions them to protect their own interests, and hedge funds and their managers are already subject to antifraud requirements. Just
Mr. Burkhard Drees, Mr. Garry J. Schinasi, Mr. Charles Frederick Kramer, and Mr. R. S Craig
netting (see Box 4.2 : Clearinghouses). While recognizing that clearing tends to concentrate risks and responsibilities for risk management in a central clearinghouse, the PWG recommended that organizations that clear futures, commodity options, and options on futures should be authorized to clear OTC derivatives, subject to CFTC oversight. Similarly, securities clearinghouses, which are subject to SECoversight, should be authorized to clear OTC derivatives. Clearing through foreign clearing systems should be allowed if these systems are supervised by foreign
private standard-setting bodies with self-regulation and SECoversight. In financial accounting, the task of setting standards was delegated to AICPA committees, which evolved into the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). For auditing, the AICPA retained its standard-setting role in the Auditing Standards Board. The rules for auditing govern the conduct of an audit and the nature of the reports, and provide monitoring by peer reviews and the Public Oversight Board. As a result of the auditing scandals, much of this standard-setting and oversight has been taken
unexpected market break. The U.S. Federal Reserve did intervene, reportedly, in the U.S. market crash of October 1987, and the New York Federal Reserve orchestrated the rescue by its lenders of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 on the ground that the systemic effects of a disorderly liquidation of the fund could not easily be quantified.
An official study was made afterwards of the LTCM rescue and other aspects of the market volatility at the time. 2 The study has an Appendix B, which discusses in detail SECoversight of broker-dealers who may
entity that previously had been regulated or supervised by the SEC or a federal bank regulatory agency 6 continues to look to that agency for oversight. Previously unregistered brokers or dealers were required to register with the SEC and join a self regulatory organization (SRO), 7 usually the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Newly registered government securities brokers or dealers are subject to SECoversight. The NASD imposes sales practice standards on its members, including government securities brokers and dealers.
The primary rule
A taxonomy of existing and planned automated trade execution systems in financial markets is provided. Over 50 automated market structures in 16 countries are analyzed. The classification scheme is organized around the principle that such markets consist of an algorithm that performs a trade matching function, together with information display and transmission mechanisms. Automated market structures are classified by ordered sets of trade execution priority rules, trade matching protocols and associated degree of automation of price discovery, and transparency, to include informational asymmetries between classes of market participants. Systematic differences in systems across types of financial instruments, geographical market centers, and over time are analyzed.
Increased legal risk for the agencies in the US
Greater SECoversight in the US
Restricted use in regulation
Structural changes to banks and limitations on bank activities
Resolution and recovery plans
Volcker rule in the US
Limitation in the US on derivatives dealing by banks
Vickers commision structural changes in UK banking
Changes in regulation of compensation and corporate governace
EU limitations on and regulation of compensation
US rules for changes in incentive compensation
This study assesses the overall impact on credit of the financial regulatory reforms in Europe, Japan, and the United States. Long-term cost estimates are provided for Basel III capital and liquidity requirements, derivatives reforms, and higher taxes and fees. Overall, average lending rates in the base case would rise by 18 bps in Europe, 8 bps in Japan, and 28 bps in the United States. These results are similar to the official BIS assessments of Basel III and an OECD analysis, but lower as a result of including expense cuts and reductions in the returns required by investors. As a result, they are markedly lower than those of the IIF.
the small number of filings under Chapter X was the result of firms’ greater and greater ability to file under Chapter XI of the Chandler Act.
The Chandler Act intended that all publicly traded firms file under Chapter X and smaller privately held firms file under Chapter XI. But no explicit formal restrictions were put on Chapter XI filings (except for the absence of secured lending). In contrast to Chapter X, under Chapter XI management retained control and there was no SECoversight. Not surprisingly, publicly traded firms increasingly tested the gray area