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Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

from central banks but also from the court system. First, there is no counterpart to RSA enforcement powers in the powers granted to a central bank with respect to its monetary policy role. Second, there are important differences between the way an RSA uses its enforcement powers and the exercise of similar powers by the court system. Unlike judicial enforcement, regulatory enforcement is proactive: RSAs take enforcement action on their own initiative and in accordance with their mandate as defined in their statutory objectives. Enforcement is not the RSAsmandate

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Les décideurs rechignent souvent à accorder l’indépendance aux agences qui réglementent et supervisent le secteur financier, car ils craignent que ces agences, avec leurs responsabilités et leurs pouvoirs étendus, puissent imposer leur loi. Cette brochure décrit les mécanismes permettant de garantir que ces agences soient redevables non seulement envers l'État, mais également envers le secteur qu'elles supervisent et envers le grand public, et propose des exemples de divers pays.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Las autoridades de política económica suelen ser renuentes a otorgar independencia a los organismos que regulan y supervisan el sector financiero debido al temor de que estos organismos, con responsabilidades y poderes de amplio alcance, puedan convertirse en una fuente normativa por sí mismos. Este folleto describe los mecanismos para que los organismos reguladores rindan cuentas no solo ante el gobierno sino también ante la industria que supervisan y el público en general, con ejemplos sobre una amplia gama de países.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.