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Mr. Alberto Behar and Sandile Hlatshwayo
This note explains the value of strategic foresight and provides implementation advice based on the IMF’s experience with scenario planning and policy gaming. Section II provides an overview of strategic foresight and some of its tools. Scenario planning and policy gaming have been the Fund’s main foresight techniques so far, though other tools have been complementary. Accordingly, section III focuses on the scenario planning by illustrating applications before detailing the methods we have been using, while section IV describes policy gaming including the matrix policy gaming approach with which we have experimented so far. Section V summarizes the key points. In so doing, the note extends an invitation to those in the economics and finance fields (e.g., researchers, policymakers) to incorporate strategic foresight in their analysis and decision making.
Mr. Alberto Behar and Sandile Hlatshwayo

paths to aspirational futures or alternatively using pre-mortem techniques to anticipate failure, and role-playing through policy gaming. Regardless of the specific tool employed, strategic foresight offers ways to “learn from tomorrow” ( Édes 2021 ). Strategic foresight has been successfully deployed in different types of organizations to navigate an uncertain future. Governments, international policy institutions, and the private sector use strategic foresight. Recognized scenario-planning pioneers include Shell in the 1970s, which still uses it to evaluate its

Guy Debelle
This paper extends the analysis of central bank independence to a model in which there is more than one policymaker. It shows that the degree of central bank independence as generally defined in the existing theoretical literature is only one of the influences on macroeconomic performance. The objectives of the fiscal authority, the commitment mechanisms available to the authorities and the nature of the policy game play a key role in determining the inflation rate and output in the economy. Furthermore, the model can be solved for the optimal degree of inflation aversion of the central bank. , a Working Paper and the authors) would welcome any comments on the present text Citations should refer to a Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, mentioning the authors), and the date of issuance. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Fund.
Guy Debelle

nature of the policy game affects the level of inflation and output. In contrast to the previous literature which has focussed on the Nash equilibrium of the policy game, this paper also examines the Stackelberg equilibria, which may be a more accurate depiction of the actual relationship between central banks and government. If the fiscal authority has the superior commitment technology (is the dominant player in the policy game), then the inflation rate is likely to be higher than if the two players move simultaneously (neither’s commitment is superior). If the