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Charles Vellutini and Juan Carlos Benitez
This paper presents a novel technique to measure and compare the redistributive capacity of observed tax (or transfer) policies. The technique is based on income distribution simulations and controls for differences in pre-tax income distributions. It assumes that the only information on the pre-tax distribution available in each country-year is the Gini coefficient and the mean (GDP per capita). We illustrate the technique with an application to the personal income tax, using a dataset of 108 countries over the 2007-2018 period.
Charles Vellutini and Juan Carlos Benitez

. A Simplified Step-by-Step Recapitulation IV. AN APPLICATION: REDISTRIBUTE CAPACITY OF THE PIT AROUND THE WORLD A . Objective and Caveats B . Data C . Results V. CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES FIGURES 1. Taxation of Capital Gains 2. Special Tax Regimes for Unincorporated Business Income 3. Distribution of Market Income Gini Coefficients 4. Features of the PIT 5. PIT Transplant-and-Compare Indices, Simplified vs Microdata 6. PIT Redistributive Capacity as a Function of Progressive Capacity and the Aggregate Tax Rate 7. Average PIT Progressive and

Chuling Chen, Ms. Era Dabla-Norris, Jay Rappaport, and Ms. Aleksandra Zdzienicka

) 10. Effects of Tax Reforms on the Probability of Reelection of the Government depending on Growth Regimes (marginal effects) 11. Effects of Tax Reforms on the Probability of Reelection of the Government depending on PIT Progressivity (marginal effects) REFERENCES ANNEXES A1. Data Sources A2. Selected Summary Statistics A3. Effects of Tax Reforms on the Probability of Reelection of the Government: Alternative Database A4. Differential Impact of Positive versus Negative Tax Reforms A5. Effects of Tax Reforms on the Probability of Reelection of the

Chuling Chen, Ms. Era Dabla-Norris, Jay Rappaport, and Ms. Aleksandra Zdzienicka
This paper studies the impact of tax-based consolidations on reelection outcomes. Using a granular database of tax-based consolidations for a panel of 10 OECD countries over the last 40 years, we find that tax reforms are politically costly but some reforms are costlier than others. Measures aimed primarily at reducing existing deficits and debt are costlier than tax consolidation policies for improving long-term growth prospects. Electoral costs are particularly high for broad-based indirect tax and corporate tax reforms. Voters tend to penalize governments less if tax consolidations are announced early in the government’s term or if the government has a strong political mandate. Favorable economic conditions increase public support for tax-based consolidations. Personal income tax reforms are electorally salient if the reforms are frontloaded, announced during recessions, and in less progressive tax systems.
Chuling Chen, Ms. Era Dabla-Norris, Jay Rappaport, and Ms. Aleksandra Zdzienicka

on the probability of reelection depending on whether reforms are introduced in countries with low income tax progressivity compared to countries with high PIT progressivity. We compute the indicator of PIT progressivity as: 1 – (100-marginal tax rate)/(100-average tax rate) and identify high PIT progressivity countries where this is above 25th percentile of the country sample. Specifically, we estimate Equation (3) with the dummy variable D i t l ( D i t h ) that takes the value of 1 (0) when the PIT progressivity indicator is above (below) the 25th percentile

International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.

.5-percentage point increase in employer OSMI contributions. An additional 5-percent employer contribution to the pension fund was initially scheduled for 2020, but is now likely to be delayed to 2023. These new contributions will bring the total tax and contribution burdens above the levels prevailing prior to the 2007–08 reforms. C. Progressivity of Labor Taxes 6. The only source of progressivity in labor taxes and contributions comes from the PIT . Progressivity is defined as an increasing average effective tax rate, i.e., tax liability divided by gross income, as

Mr. Steven A. Symansky and Mr. Thomas Baunsgaard

progressivity or a larger share of revenue from PIT collections in the base case. This provides a crude measure of the contribution to the automatic stabilizers from the existing PIT progressivity. Table A1. Illustrative Impact of Personal Income Tax Progressivity Changes on Automatic Stabilizers, 2005–2007 Average Weighted revenue elasticities 1/ Impact on budget balance 2/ Base case I. PIT elasticity is unitary 3/ II. PIT elasticity increased by 10 percent 4/ III. PIT elasticity as in Germany 5/ Base case I. PIT elasticity is

Baoping Shang

distributional impact depends on the exact design of the PIT cut. The PIT cut could be at the top bracket or at the bottom bracket. Lowering PIT rate at the top bracket would reduce PIT progressivity and at the bottom bracket improve PIT progressivity. The existence of exemptions and deductions complicates the assessment of PIT progressivity ( Gerber and others, 2020 ). To the extent that low-income households do not pay much income tax, it would be difficult for low-income households to benefit from a PIT cut. Lowering corporate income tax (CIT) . The economic literature

Baoping Shang
Addressing the poverty and distributional impacts of carbon pricing reforms is critical for the success of ambitious actions in the fight against climate change. This paper uses a simple framework to systematically review the channels through which carbon pricing can potentially affect poverty and inequality. It finds that the channels differ in important ways along several dimensions. The paper also identifies several key gaps in the current literature and discusses some considerations on how policy designs could take into account the attributes of the channels in mitigating the impacts of carbon pricing reforms on households.
International Monetary Fund

to deduct losses incurred in previous years. The CIT is mostly collected in the form of withholding taxes on imports and exports creditable against the income tax (see below). Personal income tax (PIT) Progressive schedule comprising 21 brackets, with rates varying from 4 to 60 percent. Income of employees (salaries and wages) and profits of noncorporate entities. The basis for taxation is Afghan citizenship. The tax is imposed on the worldwide income of Afghan citizens wherever they live. The wage PIT that used to be collected