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Ms. Julianne Ams, Mr. Tamon Asonuma, Mr. Wolfgang Bergthaler, Ms. Chanda M DeLong, Ms. Nouria El Mehdi, Mr. Mark J Flanagan, Mr. Sean Hagan, Ms. Yan Liu, Charlotte J. Lundgren, Mr. Martin Mühleisen, Alex Pienkowski, Mr. Gustavo Pinto, and Mr. Eric Robert

had collapsed. In subsequent years, IMF responsibilities changed and expanded. As balance-of-payment imbalances grew, the frequency and size of IMF financing increased. And with fewer rules governing the international monetary system, the IMF’s surveillance role was greatly enhanced. These structural changes meant that when the 1980s Debt Crisis erupted, the IMF found itself at the core of managing the emergency. 3. During the 1970s, the risk of sovereign default was not perceived as a major concern. Most “external arrears” generated by a country were created by

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

to have a significant and sustainable impact. To ensure their relevance and proper design, as well as to enhance their effectiveness, the conditions set should pertain to the core areas of IMF responsibility where staff has in-depth knowledge: fiscal and monetary policy, and certain aspects of finance and trade. The use of structural benchmarks should be discontinued, and conditions with low structural content should not be part of conditionality. Generally, the Fund should accommodate national authorities’ desire to have program-related documents address policies

Mr. Carlo Cottarelli

pruning of IMF responsibilities is needed, one should not forget that a rigid breakdown of economic problems by their nature is not easy. In particular, macroeconomic issues and structural issues are often closely related, and excessively constraining the scope of the IMF’s work would inevitably impair its effectiveness. 35 Combining selectivity in the issue dimension with selectivity in the country dimension—dealing with certain issues only in countries where those issues are macroeconomically relevant—could thus provide a more effective approach. The question is how

International Monetary Fund
This paper sets out Management’s response to the Independent Evaluation Office’s (IEO) report entitled Behind the Scenes with Data at the IMF: An IEO Evaluation. The implementation plan proposes specific actions to address the recommendations of the IEO that were endorsed by the Board in its March 17, 2016 discussion of the IEO’s report, namely: (i) develop a long-term strategy for data and statistics at the Fund; (ii) define and prioritize the Fund’s data needs and support data provision by member countries accordingly; (iii) reconsider the role and mandate of the Statistics Department; (iv) reexamine the staff’s structure of incentives in the area of data management; (v) make clear the limits of IMF responsibility regarding the quality of disseminated data, and clarify the distinction between “IMF data” and “official data.” The implementation of some of these proposed actions is already underway. The paper also explains how implementation will be monitored.
International Monetary Fund

needs, manage data and statistics effectively, and orient the Fund’s statistical activities to meet the needs of the international community. These are: Develop a long-term strategy for data and statistics at the Fund. Define and prioritize the Fund’s data needs and support data provision by member countries accordingly. Reconsider the role and mandate of the Statistics Department. Reexamine the staff’s structure of incentives in the area of data management. Make clear the limits of IMF responsibility regarding the quality of disseminated data, and

Ms. Julianne Ams, Mr. Tamon Asonuma, Mr. Wolfgang Bergthaler, Ms. Chanda M DeLong, Ms. Nouria El Mehdi, Mr. Mark J Flanagan, Mr. Sean Hagan, Ms. Yan Liu, Charlotte J. Lundgren, Mr. Martin Mühleisen, Alex Pienkowski, Mr. Gustavo Pinto, and Mr. Eric Robert

Abstract

“The IMF’s Role in the Prevention and Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises” provides a guided narrative to the IMF’s policy papers on sovereign debt produced over the last 40 years. The papers are divided into chapters, tracking four historical phases: the 1980s debt crisis; the Mexican crisis and the design of policies to ensure adequate private sector involvement (“creditor bail-in”); the Argentine crisis and the search for a durable crisis resolution framework; and finally, the global financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis, and their aftermaths.