The provision of temporary financial support, in the form of loans of foreign exchange, to member countries with balance of payments difficulties is one of the IMF's main responsibilities. Its financial assistance is provided under a variety of policies and lending instruments (Table 3.1). Most forms of IMF financing are made conditional on the adoption by the recipient country of policies of adjustment and reform designed to correct the problems that gave rise to its need for support. Such conditionality is important also to ensure that the IMF's resources are safeguarded for the use of members in future need.
countries emerging from a crisis are able to regain access to international capital markets.
The IMF continued to aim for improved program design during FY2006. It issued revised operational guidance for the conditionality in Fund programs based on the lessons drawn from its 2004–05 Conditionality Review. 1 Evaluations of past IMF-supported programs, which began in 2003 as part of the Fund’s response to the IEO’s evaluation of prolonged use of Fund resources, continued to provide useful lessons for both program design and
The Annual Report 2006 to the Board of Governors reviews the IMF’s activities and policies during the financial year (May 1, 2005, through April 30, 2006). The main sections cover the Fund’s Medium-Term Strategy; country, global, and regional surveillance; strengthening surveillance and crisis prevention; IMF program support and crisis resolution; the Fund’s role in low-income countries; technical assistance and training; financial operations and policies; and governance and management of the IMF. Besides the full financial statements for the year, appendixes cover international reserves, financial operations and transactions, principal policy decisions, press communiqués of advisory committees, Executive Directors and their voting power, and changes in the Executive Board’s membership.
Mr. Christian Mumssen, Yasemin Bal Gunduz, Mr. Christian H Ebeke, and Ms. Linda Kaltani
suggests that longer-term IMFprogramsupport may indeed have helped LICs sustain economic growth and boost resilience by building fiscal buffers ( Section III ). Our findings indicate that while the majority of LICs improved their longer-term macroeconomic performance, this tendency was more pronounced for those with longer-term IMF support (at least five years of program engagement per decade). Specifically, controlling for selection bias, the study shows that between 1986 and 2010, LICs with IMF-supported programs experienced, on average, significantly higher real per
Yasemin Bal Gunduz, Mr. Christian H Ebeke, Ms. Burcu Hacibedel, Ms. Linda Kaltani, Ms. Vera V Kehayova, Mr. Chris Lane, Mr. Christian Mumssen, Miss Nkunde Mwase, and Mr. Joseph Thornton
two subsets: those aiming to provide more prolonged support, and those aiming to provide short-term financing in response to shocks ( Chapter 3 ). This paper also proposes a number of other refinements to the existing literature, including taking into account the implementation of IMF-supported programs and examining a wider range of macroeconomic and social outcomes using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to correct for selection bias.
Using these techniques, our evidence suggests that longer-term IMFprogramsupport may indeed have helped LICs sustain economic
Mr. Masahiro Nozaki, Mr. Benedict J. Clements, and Mr. Sanjeev Gupta
the past decade, our work takes an additional step to address the critics’ claims.
The data set we use is the most comprehensive ever assembled for this purpose. It draws on public spending data for education and health for 1985–2009 from 140 developing countries, including 70 low-income countries eligible for concessional IMF financing. Thus, our study adds weight to earlier empirical analysis by assessing the relationship between IMFprogramsupport and changes in social spending since 2000.
While education and health spending accelerated for all countries