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Yasemin Bal Gunduz, Mr. Christian H Ebeke, Ms. Burcu Hacibedel, Ms. Linda Kaltani, Ms. Vera V Kehayova, Mr. Chris Lane, Mr. Christian Mumssen, Miss Nkunde Mwase, and Mr. Joseph Thornton

Abstract

This paper aims to assess the economic impact of the IMF’s support through its facilities for low-income countries. It relies on two complementary econometric analyses: the first investigates the longer-term impact of IMF engagement—primarily through successive medium-term programs under the Extended Credit Facility and its predecessors (and more recently the Policy Support Instrument)—on economic growth and a range of other indicators and socioeconomic outcomes; the second focuses on the role of IMF shock-related financing—through augmentations of Extended Credit Facility arrangements and short-term and emergency financing instruments—on short-term macroeconomic performance.

Yasemin Bal Gunduz, Mr. Christian H Ebeke, Ms. Burcu Hacibedel, Ms. Linda Kaltani, Ms. Vera V Kehayova, Mr. Chris Lane, Mr. Christian Mumssen, Miss Nkunde Mwase, and Mr. Joseph Thornton

that will have a major impact on demand for IMF program engagement in LICs: Continued global uncertainty in the near term . The financing needs of LICs are likely to remain elevated until the financial and economic issues in Europe are resolved, and until growth is more firmly entrenched in the United States and other major economies. Moreover, the financial buffers of LICs remain diminished relative to the period before 2008. Continued graduation of countries from the IMF’s concessional financing terms . Based on projected GDP growth rates from the IMF

Yasemin Bal Gunduz, Mr. Christian H Ebeke, Ms. Burcu Hacibedel, Ms. Linda Kaltani, Ms. Vera V Kehayova, Mr. Chris Lane, Mr. Christian Mumssen, Miss Nkunde Mwase, and Mr. Joseph Thornton

Abstract

This paper aims to assess the economic impact of the IMF’s support through its facilities for low-income countries. It relies on two complementary econometric analyses: the first investigates the longer-term impact of IMF engagement—primarily through successive medium-term programs under the Extended Credit Facility and its predecessors (and more recently the Policy Support Instrument)—on economic growth and a range of other indicators and socioeconomic outcomes; the second focuses on the role of IMF shock-related financing—through augmentations of Extended Credit Facility arrangements and short-term and emergency financing instruments—on short-term macroeconomic performance.

Yasemin Bal Gunduz, Mr. Christian H Ebeke, Ms. Burcu Hacibedel, Ms. Linda Kaltani, Ms. Vera V Kehayova, Mr. Chris Lane, Mr. Christian Mumssen, Miss Nkunde Mwase, and Mr. Joseph Thornton

Abstract

This paper aims to assess the economic impact of the IMF’s support through its facilities for low-income countries. It relies on two complementary econometric analyses: the first investigates the longer-term impact of IMF engagement—primarily through successive medium-term programs under the Extended Credit Facility and its predecessors (and more recently the Policy Support Instrument)—on economic growth and a range of other indicators and socioeconomic outcomes; the second focuses on the role of IMF shock-related financing—through augmentations of Extended Credit Facility arrangements and short-term and emergency financing instruments—on short-term macroeconomic performance.

Yasemin Bal Gunduz, Mr. Christian H Ebeke, Ms. Burcu Hacibedel, Ms. Linda Kaltani, Ms. Vera V Kehayova, Mr. Chris Lane, Mr. Christian Mumssen, Miss Nkunde Mwase, and Mr. Joseph Thornton

Abstract

This paper aims to assess the economic impact of the IMF’s support through its facilities for low-income countries. It relies on two complementary econometric analyses: the first investigates the longer-term impact of IMF engagement—primarily through successive medium-term programs under the Extended Credit Facility and its predecessors (and more recently the Policy Support Instrument)—on economic growth and a range of other indicators and socioeconomic outcomes; the second focuses on the role of IMF shock-related financing—through augmentations of Extended Credit Facility arrangements and short-term and emergency financing instruments—on short-term macroeconomic performance.

Mr. Christian H Ebeke and Miss Dilan Ölcer

Front Matter Page Strategy, Policy, and Review Department Content Abstract I. Introduction II. How is fiscal policy conducted over the election cycle? Preliminary evidence A. Baseline specification and data B. Baseline estimates Composition of expenditures Composition of tax revenues Overall fiscal balance III. Dealing with the endogeneity of election timing IV. Domestic and international scrutiny A. Do fiscal rules matter? B. IMF program engagement V. Concluding remarks References Appendix Table A1

International Monetary Fund

Developments 4. External Sector, 2005–11 BOX 1. Ex-Post Assessment (EPA) of Longer-term IMF Program Engagement APPENDIXES I. Letter of Intent II. Technical Note on the Treatment of Oil Production in the Macroeconomic Framework ATTACHMENTS I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies for 2012–15 II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding Front Matter Page INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND July 6, 2012 Prepared By African Department (in consultation with other departments) Contents RELATIONS WITH THE FUND

Mr. Daouda Sembene

model the level and importance of interpersonal trust between the authorities and the IMF staff in the outcome of IMF program engagement, given that the closest and most frequent interactions between the IMF and its member countries are maintained between these two parties. Trust is defined as an expectancy of positive or nonnegative outcomes from which IMF staff and country authorities can benefit based on each other’s expected action. Indeed, to the extent that trust can be conceptually placed in an individual as well as a group of individuals, this definition can

Mr. Daouda Sembene
This paper is an attempt to identify the determinants of trust between country authorities and IMF staff in the context of an IMF-supported program. Using an outcomes-based definition of trust, a game-theoretic model is developed to compute the level of trust between the two parties. The results and the analysis of trust-related issues emerging in a program context suggest that trust between country authorities and IMF staff exerts a positive impact on the likelihood of program success through its ability to improve the quality of the design, the efficiency of negotiation, and the effectiveness of implementation of an IMF-supported program. Some initiatives to secure such benefits and enhance trust in staff are proposed.