Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 14 items for :

  • "IMF balance of payments data" x
Clear All
Mr. Robin Koepke and Simon Paetzold
This paper provides an analytical overview of the most widely used capital flow datasets. The paper is written as a guide for academics who embark on empirical research projects and for policymakers who need timely information on capital flow developments to inform their decisions. We address common misconceptions about capital flow data and discuss differences between high-frequency proxies for portfolio flows. In a nowcasting “horse race” we show that high-frequency proxies have significant predictive content for portfolio flows from the balance of payments (BoP). We also construct a new dataset for academic use, consisting of monthly portfolio flows broadly consistent with BoP data.
Mr. Eugenio M Cerutti and Mr. Maurice Obstfeld

markets is also visible in IMF Balance of Payments data, highlighting the wide scope for further external integration of those markets. The international investment position of China as of 2015 showed that its liabilities to foreigners (claims of nonresidents on Chinese residents) were about 40 percent of domestic GDP ( Figure 4 , panel 1), substantially below the levels of the United States (about 160 percent of GDP), Japan (115 percent), as well as Korea (65 percent) and India (55 percent). Figure 4: International Investment Position Sources: Lane and Milesi

Cerutti Eugenio

Supervisory Service, Republic of Korea; Haver Analytics; Ministry of Finance, Japan; People’s Bank of China; Reserve Bank of India; Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association; US Department of Treasury; and authors’ calculations. 1 Data as of end of fiscal year (March) for India. 2 Data for India include only government securities. Limited foreign participation in China’s financial markets is also visible in IMF balance of payments data, highlighting the wide scope for further external integration of those markets. The international investment position

, the thresholds used vary between 10 percent (OECD, United States, and Japan) and 25 percent (Germany) of ownership of the voting stock; they also vary over time (Japan reduced the threshold in 1980 from 20 percent to 10 percent). The key characteristic in determining FDI is having an “effective management voice,” and this depends on firm specific circumstances. In theory, two principal data series—the IMF balance of payments data and the OECD/DAC data are the same two streams of data examined from different ends. The IMF data look at the inflow of FDI into the host

Samy Ben Naceur, Mr. Ralph Chami, and Mohamed Trabelsi
This paper explores the relationship between remittances and financial inclusion for a sample of 187 countries over the period 2004-2015, using cross-country as well as dynamic panel GMM regressions. At low levels of remittances-to-GDP, these flows act as a substitute to formal financial channels, thereby reducing financial inclusion. In contrast, when remittance-to-GDP ratio is high, above 13% on average, they tend to complement formal access and usage channels, thus enhancing financial inclusion. This “U shaped” relationship highlights the role of remittance flows in financing household consumption at low levels, while raising formal household bank savings and allowing for more intermediation, at high levels of remittance-to-GDP.
Samy Ben Naceur, Mr. Ralph Chami, and Mohamed Trabelsi

(% of GDP): Personal remittances are composed of personal transfers and compensation of employees. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual. World Bank staff estimates based on IMF balance of payments data, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$): GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Inflation (Inf

Mr. Shafik Hebous, Mr. Alexander D Klemm, and Yuou Wu
Profit shifting by multinational enterprises—through manipulation of transfer prices of related-party trade, intragroup lending, or the location of intangibles—affects international flows, raising the question of its impact on the current account and external balances. This paper approaches this question theoretically and empirically. In theory, profit shifting distorts the components of the current account and bilateral current account balances but leaves a country’s aggregate net balance unaffected. There is, however, a real effect on current account balances, because taxes are paid to different jurisdictions. Moreover—in practice—the measured current account could change, because not all transactions are equally easy to track. Our panel empirical results broadly confirm that the current account balance tends to be, on average, unaffected by profit shifting, but taking heterogeneity into account we find that both the real tax effect and mismeasurement strengthen income balances—and thus the current account—in investment hubs.
Mr. Shafik Hebous, Mr. Alexander D Klemm, and Yuou Wu

–2018 Source: Authors Estimates based on IMF Balance of Payments Data and the grouping of countries as tax base gainers based on the cited papers. RoW stands for the rest of the world—including all non-tax base gainers in the sample. B. Regression Analysis Profit Shifting and the Current Account Specifications While the above graphical evidence is informative, in this section we complement it by a regression analysis to control for other potential determinants of external balances. We base our benchmark specification on established existing literature

Mr. Ilhyock Shim and Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan

(2010) and Bénétrix, Lane and Shambaugh (2015) consider both FX loans and FX bonds, but their approach is based on “estimates” and not real exposures. They combine BIS and IMF balance of payments data in order to obtain “estimates” for a large cross-section of countries only for cross-border FX exposures and not total FX exposures. We have a limited set of countries compared to those papers but use data on “actual” FX exposures to both domestic and foreign lenders. In order to estimate the “share” of FX debt in total debt of the non-financial sector, we use the

Mr. Ilhyock Shim and Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan
We quantify the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on firm leverage. When home currency appreciates, firms who hold foreign currency debt and local currency assets observe higher net worth as appreciation lowers the value of their foreign currency debt. These firms can borrow more as a result and increase their leverage. When home currency depreciates, the reverse happens as firms have to de-lever with a negative shock to their balance sheets. Using firm-level data for leverage from 10 emerging market economies during the period from 2002 to 2015, we show that firms operating in countries whose non-financial sectors hold more of the debt in foreign currency, increase (decrease) their leverage relatively more after home currency appreciations (depreciations). Combining the leverage data with firm-level FX debt data for 4 emerging market countries, we further show that our results hold at the most granular level. Our quantitative results are asymmetric: the effects of depre-ciations, that are generally associated with sudden stops, are quantitatively larger than those of appreciations, which take place at a slower pace over time during capital inflow episodes. As our exercise compares depreciations and appreciations of similar size, these results are suggestive of financial frictions being more binding during depreciations than a possible relaxation of such frictions during appreciations.