Jean Chateau, Ms. Wenjie Chen, Ms. Florence Jaumotte, and Karlygash Zhunussova
use of potential carbon pricing revenues. 9
The results of the model simulations are insightful, however, as they allow for comparing the impacts of policy mixes on the entire economy in equilibrium. The results highlight a gradual decrease in the associated shadow price of carbon reflective of each scenario’s policy, indicating reductions in inefficiencies. At the same time, the average annual GDPcost in the policy scenario relative to the BAU case also declines as policies progress from the 2030 peak scenario to a more optimal scenario with early peak in
Jean Chateau, Ms. Florence Jaumotte, and Gregor Schwerhoff
This paper discusses and analyzes various international mechanisms to scale up global action on climate mitigation and address the policy gap in this area. Despite the new commitments made at COP 26, there is still an ambition and a policy gap at the global level to keep temperature increases below the 2°C agreed in Paris. Avoiding the worst outcomes of climate change requires an urgent scaling up of climate policies. Recent policy proposals include the idea of common minimum carbon prices, which underlie the IMF’s international carbon price proposal (Parry, Black, and Roaf 2021) and the climate club proposal of the German government. While global carbon prices are not a new idea, the new elements are the use of carbon price floors—which allow countries to do more if they wish—and the differentiation of carbon price floors by level of development. In the absence of international coordination, countries with ambitious climate policies are considering introducing a border carbon adjustment mechanism to prevent domestic producers from being at a competitive disadvantage due to more ambitious domestic climate policies. An interesting question from the global perspective is whether border carbon adjustment would deliver substantial additional emissions reductions or incentivize other countries to join a carbon price floor agreement.
estimated at 4½ percent of GDP per year by 2010 when domestic diesel subsidies are completely withdrawn . Gross budgetary saving is projected at about 6½ percent of GDP, comprising additional gross revenue of 11.3 percent of GDP minus a 4.8 percent of GDPcost of the envisaged cash compensation. However, higher diesel prices will increase government spending on goods and services and on developmental expenditure estimated at 2 percent of GDP per year when the diesel subsidies are fully withdrawn.
Net Budgetary Impact from Phasing Out PPS
(In percent of GDP
Government debt in many small states has risen beyond sustainable levels and some governments are considering fiscal consolidation. This paper estimates fiscal policy multipliers for small states using two distinct models: an empirical forecast error model with data from 23 small states across the world; and a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model calibrated to a hypothetical small state’s economy. The results suggest that fiscal policy using government current primary spending is ineffective, but using government investment is very potent in small states in affecting the level of their GDP over the medium term. These results are robust to different model specifications and characteristics of small states. Inability to affect GDP using current primary spending could be frustrating for policymakers when an expansionary policy is needed, but encouraging at the current juncture when many governments are considering fiscal consolidation. For the short term, however, multipliers for government current primary spending are larger and affected by imports as share of GDP, level of government debt, and position of the economy in the business cycle, among other factors.
Ms. Lisa Drakes, Ms. Chrystol Thomas, Roland Craigwell, and Kevin Greenidge
This paper addresses the issue of threshold effects between public debt and economic growth in the Caribbean. The main finding is that there exists a threshold debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio of 55–56 percent. Moreover, the debt dynamics begin changing well before this threshold is reached. Specifically, at debt levels lower than 30 percent of GDP, increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio are associated with faster economic growth. However, as debt rises beyond 30 percent, the effects on economic growth diminishes rapidly and at debt levels reaching 55-56 percent of GDP, the growth impacts switch from positive to negative. Thus, beyond this threshold, debt becomes a drag on growth.