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Mr. David A. Grigorian and Mr. Maxym Kryshko
The paper uses a unique survey of remittance-receiving individuals from Tajikistan to study the impact of policy awareness on consumer behavior. The results show that knowledge of deposit insurance encourages the use of formal channels for transmitting remittances and reduces dollarization. Given the size and importance of remittances in Tajikistan, improving financial literacy and better publicizing details of the social safety net may encourage a more frequent use of formal channels for transferring remittances and reduce reliance on foreign exchange for transaction purposes. This is likely to improve bank profitability, enhance financial stability, and improve access to finance.
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Edward Kane, and Mr. Luc Laeven

Front Matter Page Research Department Contents I. Introduction II. The Database A. Variable Definitions III. Main Features of Deposit Insurance Schemes Around the World IV. Depositor Protection During the Global Financial Crisis V. Concluding Remarks References Figures Figure 1. Explicit Deposit Insurance by Income Group, 2013 Figure 2. Explicit Deposit Insurance by Region, 2013 Figure 3. Type of DI Scheme, 2013 Figure 4. Objective of the DI Scheme, 2013 Figure 5. Organization of the DI Scheme, 2013 Figure 6

Mr. David A. Grigorian and Mr. Maxym Kryshko

I. Introduction and Motivation A well-functioning deposit insurance (DI) scheme could be an important deterrent for a bank run and a subsequent financial crisis in both developed and developing countries. In a developing country set-up, it may also play an important role in determining whether individuals trust the financial sector enough to transact with it. In addition, lack of trust could influence the currency mix of savings and cash balances, often posing a considerable challenge for the conduct of the monetary policy and making a financial crisis more

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Edward Kane, and Mr. Luc Laeven
This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
Michael Koetter, Mr. Tigran Poghosyan, and Thomas Kick

, as is also the case for Germany ( IMF, 2009a ). In Germany, privately-owned financial institutions are required by law to participate in a legal deposit insurance (DI) scheme. The DI scheme guarantees 90 percent of each customer’s deposits up to a maximum amount of 20,000 Euro. Voluntary DI schemes of banking associations supplement legal DI. 11 Voluntarily DI schemes guarantee substantially larger deposit volumes. Both DI schemes aim to protect private persons and (in particular small) firms. In general, each scheme is based on the insurance principle. Support

International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This technical note on Crisis Management, Resolution, and Safety Nets on Singapore highlights that the resolution tools are well designed, with the exception of bail-in powers; however, steps are still needed to operationalize the resolution plans. The note reviews current practices, considering international best practice principles as outlined in the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes for Effective Resolution of Financial Institutions and the International Association of Deposit Insurers’ Core Principles Effective Deposit Insurance Systems. Monetary Authority of Singapore currently develops resolution plans for Domestic Systemically Important Bank only. The resolution plans for each institution must be reviewed for both internal consistency and cross-institutional consistency. Some extension of resolution planning should be considered. The funding arrangements for resolution aim at limiting public sector exposure to loss. Losses will be first borne by equity holders and unsecured subordinated creditors. When additional funds are required, the deposit insurance fund, built by ex-ante premiums from members, can be used to support the resolution of members on an equivalent cost basis.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Meeting should meet on a regular basis to discuss systemic risk scenarios and plans to address such crises. Working Groups should meet regularly to review analytical tools and develop mechanisms for rapid policy response to a crisis. C M Expand contingency planning for systemic crisis to include system-wide crisis simulation exercises for specific D-SIBs. C M Deposit insurance SDIC should be notified of emerging distress and participate in discussions relating to the resolution of DI Scheme members. I H SDIC could continue to

International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.

to introduce a deposit insurance (DI) scheme. On solidifying the monetary union, our authorities have made significant progress in modernizing the payment system by introducing the Eastern Caribbean Automated Clearing House (ECACH) and the Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) systems and are moving ahead with plans to introduce a digital version of the EC dollar. Our authorities strongly believe that a digital version of the EC dollar (DXCD) will help support the economic transformation of the ECCU . A DXCD will support the modernization of the payment system by

International Monetary Fund
This technical note discusses the lessons learned from the financial crisis in Russia in 2008. The note summarizes key findings and recommendations, and analyzes the institutional framework and coordination arrangements for systemic risk monitoring and crisis management. It also covers crisis management tools, deals with legal protection, and assesses crisis prevention measures including approaches to intervene with potential problem institutions at an early stage.
International Monetary Fund

the CBR as bankruptcy trustees for credit institutions are appointed as liquidators. In the conduct of liquidation proceedings, the CBR audits the activities of the liquidator of the bank, establishes the rules for the submission to the CBR of the reports of the institutions being liquidated, performs accreditation of court-appointed trustees with the CBR, approves the interim liquidation balance sheets and the liquidation balance sheets and performs CBR payouts to depositors of banks that are declared bankrupt and are not participants in the DI scheme. 55