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Mr. Andrew Berg, Lahcen Bounader, Nikolay Gueorguiev, Hiroaki Miyamoto, Mr. Kenji Moriyama, Ryota Nakatani, and Luis-Felipe Zanna
Many studies predict massive job losses and real wage decline as a result of the ongoing widespread automation of production, a trend that may be further aggravated by the COVID-19 crisis. Yet automation is also expected to raise productivity and output. How can we share the gains from automation more widely, for the benefit of all? And what are the attendant equity-efficiency trade-offs? We analyze this issue by considering the effects of fiscal policies that seek to redistribute the gains from automation and address income inequality. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition, including a novel specification linking corporate power to automation. While fiscal policy cannot eliminate the classic equity-efficiency trade-offs, it can help improve them, reducing inequality at small or no loss of output. This is particularly so when policy takes advantage of novel, less distortive transmission channels of fiscal policy created by the empirically observed link between corporate market power and automation.
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.

. Public Sector Wages C. Social Welfare Schemes—Pensions D. Social Welfare Schemes—Other Programs E. Subsidies—Public Distribution Systems F. Subsidies—Energy Subsidies References FIGURES 1. A Large Public Sector Dominates the Economy 2. The Public-Sector Wage Bill is Driven by Poorly Controlled Hiring and Generous Benefits 3. The Health and Education Sectors are Struggling TAX AND CUSTOMS POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION—REFORM PRIORITIES A. Motivation and Context B. Tax Collection is Very Low in Iraq C. The Structure of the Iraqi Tax System

Mr. Andrew Berg, Lahcen Bounader, Nikolay Gueorguiev, Hiroaki Miyamoto, Mr. Kenji Moriyama, Ryota Nakatani, and Luis-Felipe Zanna

Income (EDEI) D. Social Welfare Based on Utility Function VI. ENDOGENOUS MARK-UP—AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE A. Relationship Between Automation and Price Mark-up B. Impact of Endogenous Mark-up on Production Efficiency: Two Additional Transmission Channels C. Welfare Implications of the Endogenous Mark-up VII. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS VIII. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS REFERENCES FIGURES 1. Growth Accounting: Baseline 2. Disposable Income Decomposition: Baseline 3. Raising Tax on Capital Income 4. Wealth Tax 5. Consumption Tax 6

International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.
This Selected Issues paper discusses the need to reduce Iraq’s current expenditure to create fiscal space for inclusive growth. Iraq’s public spending is high in international comparison and is driven by its two largest components: compensation of public employees and social transfers. The reform of social welfare cash transfer programs promises to improve their large targeting errors and result in greater capacity to address poverty at a lower fiscal cost. The government also needs to introduce further amendments to the draft pension bill and critically review programs benefiting victims of war and political persecution to improve their targeting and limit their potential for abuse and a negative impact on the labor supply.
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.

, (c) all education and health care privileges, and tax easements—which are not available to other pensioners—are terminated, and (d) the administration of the Martyr’s Foundation is transferred to government agencies. D. Social Welfare Schemes—Other Programs 22. The main cash welfare transfer program (SPN) is undergoing a comprehensive overhaul . The scheme was, until recently, based on categorical targeting and incurred large inclusion errors. The new, Proxy Means Testing (PMT) targeting formula introduced in 2015–16 with World Bank technical assistance

Ms. Grace B Li, James McAndrews, and Zhu Wang

, card adoption thresholds would remain unchanged for merchants and consumers. Figure 9 compares social welfare under the monopoly network versus the Ramsey social planner. The results show that at the beginning years, because the social planner invests more in R&D, social welfare in a given period is actually lower than that under the monopoly, even though consumer welfare (without profit rebates) is higher. However, social welfare in each period grows faster under the Ramsey social planner and surpasses that under the monopoly in a few years and the gap becomes

Ms. Grace B Li, James McAndrews, and Zhu Wang
It takes many years for more efficient electronic payments to be widely used, and the fees that merchants (consumers) pay for using those services are increasing (decreasing) over time. We address these puzzles by studying payments system evolution with a dynamic model in a twosided market setting. We calibrate the model to the U.S. payment card data, and conduct welfare and policy analysis. Our analysis shows that the market power of electronic payment networks plays important roles in explaining the slow adoption and asymmetric price changes, and the welfare impact of regulations may vary significantly through the endogenous R&D channel.
Mr. Andrew Berg, Lahcen Bounader, Nikolay Gueorguiev, Hiroaki Miyamoto, Mr. Kenji Moriyama, Ryota Nakatani, and Luis-Felipe Zanna

cut, which hurts production efficiency less but also reduces inequality less than the robot tax, is the best package when the inequality aversion is very low. On the other hand, packages leaning toward addressing efficiency (e.g., education spending and consumption tax) show a lower welfare effect than most others for all levels of inequality aversion. D. Social Welfare Based on Utility Function Social welfare, defined as the present value of the weighted average of utility of all household agents shows the robot tax as the best policy package, followed by